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ABSTRACT 
SAILER E. PERKINS: The Drier the Land, the Higher the Chance?: An Examination of 
The Relationship Between Water Availability and Civil Conflict Onset and Its Us 
National Security Implications 
(Under the direction of Dr. Benjamin Jones) 
 
This thesis uses quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the relationship 
between water availability and civil conflict through an ethnic conflict lens. It further 
applies the trends observed in this relationship to United States National Security 
concerns to provide real-world applications of the knowledge gained. Consisting of 
quantitative and qualitative parts, this thesis uses logit analysis of data to test for 
significance in the water-conflict relationship then conducts a case study on Israel and 
Palestine, Darfur, and ISIS in Iraq to examine how water impacts conflict in true 
situations.  
This thesis posits that increased measures of ethnic divisiveness, monopolization 
of power, autocratic rule, and shorter period of peace will inform the relationship that 
greater supply, demand, or structurally induced water scarcity will increase the likelihood 
of violent or nonviolent conflict onset. Although no reliable significant relationships were 
found, this result indicates that water is more likely an indirect contributor to conflict 
through the social processes it initiates than a consistently measurable cause of conflict. 
Through the case studies, this thesis finds that hydrological factors, lack of adaptation 
ability to environmental changes, information problems, and social processes triggered by 
water issues are indications that water may be contributing to conflict potential in real 
cases. 
Therefore, this thesis concludes that although statistical relationships between 
water scarcity and conflict outcomes eluded the analysis, there are observable instances 
in which water issues contributed indirectly to creating conditions favorable for conflict. 
In terms of United States national security interests, this conclusion necessitates that in 
order to predict and prevent water-related insecurity and instability, it is essential that the 
United States take initiative to promote knowledge of future environmental changes, their 
impacts on water and social stability, and effective adaptations for unclear future 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
A day without easy access to useable water, much less a week or month, is an 
experience nearly inconceivable in developed areas and yet altogether common outside of 
them. However, in the face of ongoing water resource degradation, population growth, 
and the looming threat of the effects of climate change on already scarce resources, water 
stands to be an increasingly prevalent source of concern for communities around the 
world (Gunasekara et. al., 2013). In fact, the per capita freshwater availability is set to 
continue on a downward trend worldwide, with a number of nations seeing expected 
decreases putting them far below the recommended minimum of 1000 cubic meters per 
capita per year by 2025 (Homer-Dixon, 1999). How do states decide to allocate water 
resources when there is so little to go around? Even today, one does not have to look very 
far to see the effects of water scarcity in such cases. For example, access to water has 
been and will continue to be a core sticking point of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
has only prolonged and exacerbated violence, animosity, and political conflict between 
the groups. In conflicts such as this, where existing societal divides meet water scarcity 
and preferential allocation, interests in control over water resources are likely to 
incentivize competing groups to act to secure what they can for the present and the future. 
Considering the high probability that in many areas water insecurity will only worsen in 
the coming decades, the dire need to secure this resource will also increase accordingly 
and likely exacerbate tensions among competing groups as allocation and access vary 
between them. This area of study attempts to find relationships between water and 
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conflict with the intent of being better able to identify potential trouble areas and mitigate 
the effects of the relevant factors. The capture of the popular imagination with concerns 
of water wars and violence in recent years, compounded by fears of climate change-
induced shortages of water in the near future and the presence of clear water elements in 
the prolongation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, reflects the timeliness of this 
study in attempting to find meaningful relationships between water resources and 
political and violent conflict. This thesis, therefore, attempts to examine the issue with a 
more societal focus in looking at how divisions interact with water scarcity to produce 
conflict. 
Water scarcity issues have gained attention due to concerns over interstate “water 
wars,” though the conversation has tended to focus less on the relationship between water 
scarcity and civil conflict (Gunasekara et. al., 2013). Many studies have examined and 
demonstrated a relationship between water stress and violence in general, and one 
specifically (Ashton 2002) looked at the unequal geographic distribution of water as it 
increases the risk of violence, though few analyses have probed the intersection of 
societal divides and water scarcity as it engenders conflict (Gunasekara, et. al. 2013). 
Homer-Dixon (1999) posited that as opposed to interstate or international conflict, 
environmental scarcity leads to social effect that are most likely to lead to violence on an 
ethnic level. However, previous studies have failed to give much attention to the presence 
of civil divides that may in fact be the moderating factor determining this violent 
outcome. Therefore, this thesis aims to assess the following question: How does the 
existence of salient social or ethnic divides inform the relationship between water 
scarcity and conflict within a nation?  
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The use of existing divides as a moderating factor differs from previous studies in 
that in this question, they play an integral role in the path from water scarcity to conflict 
rather than simply being exacerbated as a social effect of environmental stress (Homer-
Dixon, 1999). Though there are, of course, other instances that may lead to violence over 
water, this investigation into the relationship between these factors seeks to determine 
whether this is in general a volatile reaction of societal elements. 
In order to examine this question further, it is necessary to both define water 
scarcity and conflict in the context of this study. Water scarcity, easily enough quantified 
by current and predictive estimations of resource availability, must also be considered in 
terms of quality and usability. There is plenty of scientific data available to demonstrate 
the changes in physical availability of water, though the presence of water does not 
always make it useable. Access or lack thereof to useable water sources is also a form of 
stress, as is relative deprivation of water resources between members of the same society. 
Therefore, this paper utilizes measures for total resources per capita, total withdrawal per 
capita, as well as population with access to safe drinking water to represent different 
measures of water availability stemming from various causes of scarcity. 
Secondly, it is important to define the types of conflict that are likely to be 
significant as related to water conflict. Is water security only of concern when it leads to 
violence? Clearly, violent conflict – events of organized violence in which at least one 
casualty was reported - over water is a generally undesirable outcome. That is not to say 
that in some instances, particularly where historical marginalization is present, that 
violence cannot be an intended consequence of induced scarcity. Whether intentional or 
simply as a result of environmental factors and competition between groups, the element 
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of interest is the social factors that constitute the relationship between water disputes and 
violence.  
On the other hand, it may be useful to lower the threshold of conflict from only 
violent events to include data from riots, protests, and other forms of resistance that 
indicate high tensions as a result of water and a heightened risk of escalation to violence. 
This is also useful for answering the question of how and what types of conflict does 
water stress contribute to, and what factors cause variations in cases. By looking at 
instances of water stress, civil tensions, and conflict together as part of the same question, 
we can begin to create a more specific concept of water conflict. 
Experts generally attribute the relationship between environmental scarcity and 
conflict to a general increase in the stress levels of societies (Homer-Dixon, 1999), and 
this argument holds weight in considering the relationship between social divides and 
conflict induced by water. In order to connect water scarcity to violence or protest, there 
must be an intermediate step that informs the relationship and shifts it in the direction of 
conflict. As presented above, this study examines whether the presence of existing 
societal divides is indeed such an intermediate factor. However, this process alone is not 
enough to tell us how or why this interaction is volatile. 
For that, it is necessary to examine some of the societal effects engendered by this 
intersection. Water is generally an indirect cause of conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999), which 
is why this study looks not simply at correlations of scarcity and conflict, but attempts to 
examine the relationship of scarcity with another commonly cited source of conflict – 
civil divides.  In the coming years, with environmental degradation and therefore supply-
induced scarcity of useable water on the rise, many communities could see their local 
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resources diminished. Particularly in areas where water is accessed via aquifers or surface 
water sources used more heavily by outside actors, urban communities may fall victim to 
scarcity at no fault of their own and with little clout to solve the problem. Lands 
traditionally occupied by one ethnic groups could see challenges and encroachment from 
others whose resources have diminished. Others may be incentivized by increasing 
scarcity to seek territorial expansion for the acquisition of resources for the future. 
Migration, another commonly mentioned result of environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 
1999), could bring ambivalent groups closer together and increase petty tensions to the 
point of violence. These effects of scarcity, and this list is not exhaustive, are important 
alone but even more so when existing tensions between groups are high.  
To examine these mechanisms and the overall question of the relationship 
between water availability, conflict onset, and the intervening variable of social divisions, 
this study presents a quantitative analysis of data from the FAO Aquastat, Ethnic Power 
Relations, and NAVCO datasets. Through logit testing of six hypothetical models 
representing various measures for water availability and social divisiveness, the study 
finds little support for the theory that these divides are the intervening variable that 
determines whether a water-scarce society will experience conflict outbreaks or not. The 
outcome of this analysis indicates that neither the measures of water alone not their 
interactions with the intervening variables show that an increase in per capita availability 
of water resources decrease the likelihood of conflict. Though these findings are likely 
affected by the missingness of data from the Aquastat dataset for many countries, they 
are useful for indicating that the effect of water availability on conflict is likely highly 
individualized. Thus, despite the existence of cases in which water scarcity is a visible 
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catalyst for violence, these results demonstrate the difficulty and perhaps futility of 
attempting to make concrete generalizations of this relationship.  
However, having found that is there exists little significant relationship between 
issues of water scarcity, ethnic divisiveness, and incidences of conflict, it is important to 
recognize the limits of broad theoretical models of conflict for explaining the way in 
which specific intrastate conflicts occur on the ground. Furthermore, an important 
conclusion can be drawn from the lack of significant findings: that water may not affect 
conflict in the ways measured by this quantitative analysis, but may indeed still 
contribute in more subtle ways to the destabilization of societies and peace.  Although 
quantitative models may contribute to the predictability of conflict events, they tell us 
little about the underlying mechanisms. In addition to providing a more in-depth 
understanding of how state and non-state actors are affected by water uncertainties and 
the mechanisms through which water becomes a tool and facilitator of conflict or 
impediment to peace, an examination of case studies provides real-world examples that 
analysts can use to determine trends in similar situations. Therefore, the second part of 
this thesis seeks to discover what practical trends emerge from current case studies of 
water in conflict, and examine their relevance and application to potential future 
conflicts. The cases of Israel and Palestine, the Darfur conflict in Sudan, and ISIS in Iraq 
will provide real-world examples of the ways in which state and non-state actors 
negotiate their water access and political positioning through the lens of water. In all 
these cases, water can be seen as a destabilizing factor, tool or facilitator of conflict, or 
impediment to peace that affects the security of nations and regions in tangible ways. 
Therefore, despite a lack of quantitative support for the initial hypotheses presented, it is 
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clear that water may serve a minor but critical role in the transition from peace to conflict 
or the prolongation of conflict. 
Therefore, the cases studies serve to answer a different set of questions. For one, 
what processes result from water shortages that consistently contribute to increased 
conflict vulnerability, such as migration or economic damage? How do different 
hydrologies and geographical distributions of water contribute to political or physical 
conflict scenarios? In what ways do opponents use water realities or perceptions as 
political tools to alter the course of conflict? Are there visible instances in which water 
helps mitigate, rather than exacerbate, political issues? In examining these themes and 
others through the three cases of Israel, Sudan, and Iraq, this paper aims to contribute to a 
more integrated understanding of water’s role in civil conflict. The first section of the 
paper will focus on these cases individually and what they can contribute in addressing 
these questions. 
Secondly, this section aims to use the answers found through this analysis to 
determine how such understandings affect the United States’ role in maintaining global 
security and the potential impacts of water-related conflict on US national security. The 
second section of this paper will focus more exclusively on the intelligence value of this 
information and how it can contribute to informing the strategies of US foreign policy 
and intelligence communities. Through examinations of the United States’ interests and 
abilities in working to mitigate the role of water in conflict, this section seeks to provide 
viable strategy options for these communities to practice in order to mitigate the 
challenges posed by water issues around the world.  
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The importance of this issue to the United States rests on two overarching 
observations. One, that the availability of useable natural water resources in many areas 
of the world in declining due to persistent overuse and climate change effects. Secondly, 
that the areas most dramatically affected by this change in physical availability also tend 
to lie in historically more conflict-prone areas, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. 
In the context of growing uncertainty around global water and environmental resources 
and a growing, developing population, the relationship between environmental changes 
and societal and security effects is more pressing than ever. Furthermore, it is likely that 
water problems around the world will worsen at an unprecedented pace for which the 
global community has little meaningful preparation. As the global leader in security and 
foreign policy, the United States has major interests in pursuing courses of action to 
prevent the destabilization of nations or regions due to the factors discussed in the paper. 
Should environmental changes, particularly acute ones, contribute to the types of social, 
economic, and demographic disruptions that this thesis anticipates, the results are likely 
to compound in negative and destabilizing ways. In order to prevents this, it is essential 
that research and understanding of issues be prioritized to that appropriate adaptations 
can be anticipated and prepared.  
Therefore, with the intention of exploring these points, this thesis proceeds with 
an analysis of the existing relevant literature on environmental scarcity and civil conflict, 
then delves into and explanation of the theory developed to explain this relationship. 
Following the theory is an explanation of the quantitative methodology used to test the 
theory, and finally a discussion of results. This is followed by the qualitative analysis of 
case studies from Israel and Palestine, Darfur in Sudan, and Iraq and the Islamic State 
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(ISIS), and finally concludes with an interpretation of trends from the analysis holistically 
as they relate to US foreign policy options.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As an emerging field of concentrated study, the literature on water-related conflict 
suffers from expected growing pains. Pioneered as a subset of environmental questions 
on conflict by the likes of Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) and Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), 
discussion of the potential effects of water resource availability on conflict still draws 
heavily from more general environmental literature. Nevertheless, with water conflict 
spotlighted as an area of growing concern among world leaders and in the popular 
imagination (Katz 2011), it is increasingly essential that the conversation is driven by 
research rather than conjecture.  
 In contrast, the literature on ethnic conflict is more robust. Study of ethnic conflict 
is certainly not without its conflicting arguments, though this study aims to let analysis 
drive interpretation of the causal mechanisms through whichever lens is most appropriate. 
In general, the economic value of water suggests a very real, material significance to 
competing claimants over scarce resources. In addition, the necessity of water for 
economic activities and the increasingly prevalent treatment of water resources as a non-
military matter of national (or group) security (Gleick 1993) suggests a security-driven, 
rational choice perspective on the causes of domestic conflict or at least the possible role 
of water in violence. 
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Environmental Scarcity and Water Scarcity 
As water scarcity falls under the larger category of environmental scarcity in 
existing literature and derives many attributes from this general discussion, it is helpful to 
begin there. In terms of defining scarcity, a market-like view has categorized it into three 
origins: supply-induced, where a dwindling supply causes shortages; demand-induced, 
when a demand significantly increases, usually due to population change, while a supply 
remains constant or shrinks; and structural scarcity, when unequal distribution of a 
resource causes scarcity to vary (Homer-Dixon 1999, Hauge and Ellingsen 1998, Gizelis 
2010). 
A number of researchers have tried to pare down the relationship of 
environmental resources in general, and water in particular, with the likelihood of 
conflict. To begin with one of the more seminal works on the subject, Homer-Dixon’s 
“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases” (1994) finds that 
environmental scarcities contribute to persistent, diffuse, intrastate conflicts through a 
post-mortem examination of various cases. Homer-Dixon defines his notion of scarcity as 
arising from depletion, degradation, and unequal distribution of renewable resources, as 
well as increased demand on limited capacity as a function of increasing population and 
stable or decreasing supply (1994, 1999). This conceptualization has been repeated in 
many studies.  
Homer-Dixon’s main argument for why some societies are more likely to 
successfully adapt to scarcity than others is a political one that hinges on an “ingenuity 
gap” (1999). The concept of the ingenuity gap treats ideas and social capacity as factors 
similar to capital or labor, and are critical to the ability of a society to effectively manage 
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its grievances and develop. This gap, generated by the singular, complex situation of a 
particular case, such as weak or incompetent political institutions, natural disasters, 
struggling markets, or resource shortages, exists between the ingenuity that exists in a 
society and the amount required to overcome a resource shortage (1999). Homer-Dixon 
argues that this gap can turn into a cyclical erosion of government authority and 
accordingly increase the likelihood of violence while decreasing state capacity to manage 
scarcity and crises in general (1999).  
Therefore, Homer-Dixon’s mitigating factors of ingenuity and adaptability are 
tempered by his “social friction” concept, which explains that scarcities sometimes 
incentivize elites to impede innovation to protect narrow interests. These concepts 
attempt to find a middle ground between neo-Malthusian arguments, which suggest that 
growing populations will induce poverty as resources become scarcer, and economic 
optimist arguments, which depend on technological innovation to overcome scarcity. 
Furthermore, Homer-Dixon’s explanation of the link between scarcity and conflict 
suggests that effects on economic productivity, migration, social segmentation, and 
disrupted institutions contribute to the ingenuity breakdown that hinders adaptation 
(1999). Perhaps the most important aspect of Homer-Dixon’s work, however, is that 
given structural factors that encourage or inhibit ingenuity, he places a very high 
emphasis on the role of environmental scarcity as the sole driver that tips the scales into 
conflict.   
Others have meditated on similar mechanisms through empirical analysis. 
Examining this “ecoviolence” perspective that environmental scarcity leads to violence 
by hindering effective development and societal capacity, De Soysa (2002) interestingly 
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finds that the highest likelihoods of conflict related to resources were when moderate 
abundances or scarcities existed. De Soysa (2002), like Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), test 
for a variety of resources including water, but did so against proxies for ingenuity such as 
trade openness and development indices. These studies diverge where De Soysa (2002) 
finds little causal link and Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) do for aspects of their analysis. 
One of the first large-N studies for looking at environmental degradation and domestic 
armed conflict, Hauge and Ellingsen analyze the relationship between supply-induced 
scarcity (in terms of freshwater availability per capita, annual change in forest cover, and 
land degradation), demand-induced scarcity (as population density and change in 
density), structural scarcity (measured as income inequality) and the dependent variable 
of domestic armed conflict occurrence (1998). Also, taking into account a nation’s 
economic development (GNP per capita) and the type and stability of political regimes, 
Hauge and Ellingsen find that scarcity and degradation conditions compound the 
likelihood of domestic armed conflict in concert with factors such as high population 
density and income inequality (1998). Though the combination of supply, demand, and 
structurally-induced factors indicate the conflict-generating potential of scarcity, the 
authors find that environmental scarcities are secondary to explaining conflict behind 
economic and political factors (1998). 
Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) make an important observation regarding relative 
importance of factors that contribute to the emergence of domestic armed conflict. They 
criticize Homer-Dixon’s lack of dependent variable variation in the cases of his study 
(1994) for ignoring the potential for political and economic factors, such maldistribution 
of resources and income inequality, politicize resources and create structural scarcity 
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(1998). This concept of disaggregating the political and economic factors that might 
interplay with scarcity to cause conflict from the strict causal capacity of scarcity alone 
has been expanded on by studies like Gizelis (2010), which attempts to correct the failure 
of previous studies on water resources to consider the effectiveness of governance as a 
major mediating factor. Gizelis (2010) highlights the mediating role of domestic 
institutions, dependent on the institutional capacity of states to adapt to environmental 
scarcity and ensure satisfactory distribution of resources to their people, to assert that 
intrastate water resource conflicts are more institutionally rather than environmentally 
driven. Theisen (2008) also makes this critique of the literature as a whole, suggesting 
that the widely diverging opinions on the causality of environmental scarcity, and the fact 
that his study was unable to replicate Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), indicate that scarcity 
alone has little explanatory power but would do better when examined in more specific 
contexts of poverty, dysfunctional institutions, and rational choice arguments. Gleditsch 
similarly comments that research tends to neglect impactful political and economic 
factors that have more predictive power than scarcity, but rather interact with it to 
product conflict outcomes (1998). 
Despite the causality debate, a strong consensus remains that scarcity can 
contribute to detrimental social effects. Of the socioeconomic and political effects of 
scarcity that can alter the risk of conflict, and in Homer Dixon’s (1999) framework act to 
reduce ingenuity and adaptability, the expected population displacement caused by 
climate change is a major concern to some (Warner et al 2010). Scarcity acts to increase 
the general stress level of societies and may exacerbate existing tensions (Homer-Dixon 
1999), particularly via migration (Brenauer et al 2012 and Warner et al 2010).  
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In this ongoing discussion of the role of scarcity in conflict, some studies have 
taken water up as a separate case (Gizelis 2010). Though general literature on 
environmental scarcity is useful for understanding the impact of scarcity on conflict and 
society, water brings unique challenges that are overlooked by this wide scope. A large 
body of literature has been devoted to examining the potential of dramatic interstate 
water wars (Cook and Bakker 2012, Katz 2011, Gunasekara et al. 2014). However, these 
give important insights into how competing parties, national or subnational, view water in 
their conflict of interests. Gleick (1993) emphasizes that freshwater is increasingly a 
matter of national security, and that access to shared water sources has in the past been 
denied as means of exerting political or military pressure. This “real politik” perspective 
sees water resource vulnerability as a function of political-economic conditions, water 
availability, and the extent to which a resource is shared, and although Gleick suggests 
that political confrontation between states is more likely than violence, a growing 
willingness to use water supply systems are tools of war may widen disparities and 
increase the prevalence of water as a factor in conflict (1993).  
Other studies have looked specifically at water within a national context, 
generally examining scarcity as it intersects with the social, political, and economic 
factors that larger-scope studies are criticized for overlooking. Though the existence of 
water scarcity in a nation, whether supply, demand, or structurally induced, is likely to 
only contribute to conflict in concert with political and social factors, it is nevertheless an 
important area of study on its own. A resource that is not easily bound by territorial 
borders and that is often of ambiguous quality and quantity, water carries an inherent 
element of uncertainty that may play into a different rational calculous than more easily 
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quantified or divisible resources such as land. This uncertainty also makes the resource 
more susceptible to exploitation as a tool in conflict or politics. Though these intricacies 
are difficult to capture in large-N studies, the existing literature of water scarcities in 
conflict-prone political or economic conditions helps establish a general understanding of 
how water interacts with other national conditions to either produce or not produce 
conflict.  
Ashton (2002) found a significant link between unequal geographic distribution of 
water and an increased likelihood of violence in cases in Africa. Gizelis (2010) examined 
the role of institutions in ameliorating the potential consequences of water scarcity by 
having the capacity to improve storage, quality, and equality and efficiency of 
distribution. A proponent of the relative importance of institutions over environmental 
scarcity, Gizelis finds that domestic institutions mediate different types of scarcity 
because of the institutional capacity of states to adapt to scarcity and public 
dissatisfaction, while less democratic institutions are more likely to induce structural 
scarcity (unequal distribution and mismanagement) that increases the risk of water-
related conflict (2010). Looking again at societal inequality, Gunasekara analyzed this 
against water scarcity to find that “institutional and infrastructural arrangements that 
provide better access to and more equal distribution of water resources will significantly 
lower the risk of water conflict incidence in countries with low economic capacity” 
(2014).  
It is clear that consensus on the causal effects of environmental scarcities is 
significantly lacking as a whole (Gleditsch 1998, Theisen 2008, Bernauer et al. 2012). 
Though some (Homer-Dixon 1999, Hauge and Ellingsen 1998) assess a fairly causal link 
 17 
to conflict via social effects, there is little agreement on the relative significance of 
environmental scarcity in terms of other major contributing factors to violence such as 
social, economic, and institutional variables (De Soysa 2002). Furthermore, Homer-
Dixon’s backwards process-tracing method, which selects cases to examine based on the 
presence of the expected outcome, has been widely criticized as unsound (De Soysa 
2002). In general, the literature suggests that while environmental scarcity, water scarcity 
included, can lead to social effects that increase the likelihood of violence, there is little 
direct link between the presence of a scarcity and violence that may emerge that is not 
heavily tempered by other factors (Gleditsch 1998).  
At the heart of this debate is the relative importance of scarcity among other 
factors. Whereas Homer-Dixon (1999) and the ecoviolence approach suggest that scarcity 
causes social consequences that reduce adaptability and increase risk of conflict, others 
(Bernauer 2010, Gizelis 2010, De Soysa 2002, Gunasekara 2014) suggest that the 
preexisting social, political, and economic conditions of a nation determine whether 
scarcity will be of importance to conflict. Bernauer et a. (2012) explains well that scarcity 
might, under certain circumstances increase risk, but not necessarily systematically 
because this result is contingent on national adaptability and prevention of dangerous 
effects such as on economic performance and migration. Nevertheless, when the context 
of a scarcity has been examined in tandem with the context of another specific domestic 
issue, such as institutional weakness (Gizelis 2010), more consistent patterns may 
emerge. 
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Intrastate Conflict 
In examining this intersection between water scarcity and civil conflict, it is 
useful to return to some contemporary understandings of intrastate conflict in particular. 
Theories for how intrastate conflict begins, which often focus on the greed versus 
grievance argument and the role of ethnic tensions, seek to uncover the motivations and 
circumstances that transform a peaceful society into a violent one. Therefore, by 
understanding the basic arguments for civil conflict onset, one can examine ways in 
which water scarcity might fit into such constructions and contribute to violence by 
engendering grievances, competition, and opportunities to gain from conflict. 
Lake and Rothchild’s “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict” (1996) does an excellent job of giving consideration to the classic ethnic 
conflict explanations of group differences, ancient hatreds, feuds, or difficulties coping 
with modern life as possible emotional motivators, though not as causes themselves. 
Similar to the environmental scarcity discussion, Lake and Rothchild find that though 
these factors do contribute, they are minor compared to more systematic problems 
stemming from collective fears for the future.  Lake and Rothchild suggest that 
information problems, credible commitment problems, and a security dilemma over 
protecting group identity can exacerbate groups fears and cause conflict in instances 
where state weakness allows it (1996). According to this research, strategic interaction 
between groups in ethnically divided societies results in group competition over 
resources along ethnic lines, with each looking towards alternative futures to calculate 
strategies (1996). Again, these problems are alone not enough to initiate conflict without 
the impetus of information problems, commitment problems, or a security dilemma that 
 19 
incites one actor to assess that a preemptive strike is the only way to secure an advantage 
(Lake and Rothchild 1996).  
 Focusing on the onset of civil conflict in terms of systematic factors, Sambanis 
(2001) identifies that ethnic-based civil conflict and non-ethnic civil conflict tend to have 
unique causes and attributes that are often overlooked. Contrary to studies that do not 
separate civil wars by type, Sambanis (2001) finds that the level of ethnic heterogeneity 
is positively associated with ethnic conflict but not non-ethnic conflict. The differences 
between identity and nonidentity wars continue in the factors related to their onsets, as 
identity conflicts are generally caused by political grievances and unlikely to occur in 
democratic societies. Political institutions were found to be more related to ethnic conflict 
than economic variables (Sambanis 2001). However, the research suggests that the 
likelihood of civil conflict is not only a function of internal factors, but also impacted by 
regional and national-level characteristics as well. For instance, a democratic 
neighborhood tends to moderate ethnic conflict while encouraging ideological rebellion, 
while the effect of a long regional peace or neighborhood war tended to have a more 
robust effect on ethnic conflict than non-ethnic conflict (Sambanis 2001).  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) add significantly to the 
discussion on the onset of civil conflict, particularly focusing on the role of political 
institutions in creating the conditions for a feasible rebellion. Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
suggest that civil conflict since the 1950s-1960s, including ethnic conflict, are best 
examined through a lens of insurgency, wherein “small, lightly armed bands [practice] 
guerilla warfare from rural base areas” (75). Their analysis suggests that ethnic 
heterogeneity, economic and political grievances, and even ethnic discrimination 
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(represented by nations with a minority greater than 7percent of the population and a 
majority greater than 49percent), were generally insignificant to the onset of conflict 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, they find a much better predictor of conflict to be the 
existence of factors that facilitate insurgency, including weak regimes, political instability 
and recent statehood, larger populations, dependence on oil wealth, and the existence of 
mountainous territory that is difficult for a regime to govern effectively (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) take a greed-versus-grievance approach to the 
conflict-predicting properties of ethnic grievances versus political and economic factors. 
They suggest that the political conditions that allow or incentivize conflict, in their terms 
“greed” and “opportunity,” have a stronger effect on the likelihood of conflict by 
predicting when grievances are most likely to be translated into action (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). Using proxies for possible resource extortion, diaspora support, or 
support from hostile governments as representations of opportunity, Collier and Hoeffler 
find opportunity to be a better determinant than grievances as represented by measures 
for polarization, political rights, regime openness, majority percentage, and income 
inequality (2004). The authors conclude that the significance of the “opportunity” 
measures, particularly financial opportunities for rebellion, are more consistent with the 
greed explanation than the grievance view in general (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These 
two studies suggest that the existence of grievances of ethnic or economic are too 
ubiquitous to be strong predictors of conflict, with a much better indicator for the 
likelihood of conflict being the opportunity to engage in a viable insurgency.  
This literature not only give a lens through which to view the group interactions 
and competition over water that may or may not contribute to conflict, but also provide 
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an understanding of the types of disturbances and national conditions that are more likely 
than others to lead to conflict.  
 
 
Intersection – Conflict and Scarcity 
 Discussion of the role of water scarcity in civil conflict highlights a number of 
existing overlaps in the literature of general environmental scarcity and civil conflict. In 
particular, the role of institutions and their capacity to, or intention to, prevent 
maldistribution or structural scarcity of water resources comes to the forefront (Hauge 
and Ellingsen 1998). Though not all of the literature agrees on the mechanisms that relate 
scarcity and conflict, a number of important insights can be gleaned from all sides. 
For one, Homer-Dixon (1999) touches on the concept of resource capture, 
wherein groups see increasing scarcity as a potential future disadvantaged and are 
incentivized to move early to secure resources. In this context, Homer-Dixon also 
discusses rent-seeking behavior with the tradeoff of opportunity costs for actors 
attempting to capture a resource with greed as a motivator (1999). Ecological 
marginalization, when population pressure on and unequal distribution of a resource 
induced movement of people to marginalized areas such as urban slums, is another 
concept with relevancy to the civil conflict discussion (Homer-Dixon 1999). According 
to Homer-Dixon’s view that scarcity leads to institutional social weaknesses and 
subsequently violence, group fears and relative deprivation motivations are most likely to 
lead to insurgency and group-identity conflicts (1999). Furthermore, the implication that 
scarcity, especially adequate water, can lead to population displacement and increased 
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social tensions (Brenauer et al 2012 and Warner et al 2010, Homer-Dixon 1999), bodes 
unwell for areas that already have an increased risk of ethnic conflict. 
Hague and Ellingsen suggest that countries with high income inequality are more 
likely to experience domestic armed conflict than those with greater income inequality 
(1999). This idea of structural scarcity deserves more mediation in the context that we are 
examining, for in their own words Hague and Ellingsen describe this type not necessarily 
as occurring through income inequality, but more generally as “when [resources] are 
concentrated in the hands of a few people while the remaining population suffers from 
resource shortages” (1999, 301).  
With an issue as pressing as water access, which underlies productivity of a 
society, it is not a far leap to see how groups competing over water resources within a 
state could fall into a security dilemma as described by Lake and Rothchild (1996). 
Particularly when resources are dwindling at unknown rates and the preferences or power 
of an adversary may shift unexpectedly in the future, groups are incentivized to move 
quickly to secure and cement control over resources sooner rather than later. Those that 
have power may be incentivized to capture resources and increasingly concentrate them 
among elites or preferred groups. Increasing inequalities increases the likelihood of water 
conflicts, which suggests that enhancing access to water can help to lower the likelihood 
of water conflicts (Gunasekara 2014). While this may be true, the literature on ethnic 
conflict suggests that interested groups, especially those with power, will avoid a more 
equal distribution because of self-interest (Lake and Rothchild 1996).  
 Similarly, Sondershaus and Moss’ (2014) examination of a local water dispute in 
Germany found that different perceptions of vulnerability, rather than realities, were 
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shaped by institutions and social constructions and determined how groups viewed power 
relations. This echoes the alternative futures Lake and Rothchild (1996) describe, and 
demonstrates how water resources scarcity and perceptions of vulnerability may appear 
in competing groups’ calculations of fear and strategy. This example also represents an 
avenue through which ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs may play on collective 
fears of urgent scarcity to galvanize support. Gleick’s finding that nations will view and 
use freshwater resources as a matter of security and a tool of war translates easily into 
this context, particularly when state weakness allows conflicting groups to act effectively 
as autonomous bodies (1993).  
Gizelis’ (2010) study on the intersection of institutional considerations and water 
resources touches on a factor ignored in many other studies on environmental scarcity 
though very relevant to the outbreak of internal armed conflict (Sambanis 2001). His 
finding that effectiveness of governance and democracy reduces the likelihood of 
structural scarcity, mirroring Sambanis’ (2001) find that democracy and effective 
governance reduces the likelihood of ethnic conflict. These parallel findings suggest that 
in this context of civil conflict and water scarcity, similar moderating factors work to 
prevent conflict.  
 
Moving Forward 
In studying the effects of water scarcity on civil conflict, it is necessary to 
examine a nexus of both domestic factors, like social cleavages and national freshwater 
availability, with factors and processes associated more with interstate conflict over 
water, with an in-depth understanding of how institutions and group dynamics affect the 
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onset of conflict. The result is a more comprehensive picture of how salient social 
cleavages act, particularly in areas of low government sovereignty and power, as pseudo-
states to negotiate access to water resources via either diplomacy or conflict. Therefore, 
this study necessarily combines literature on both the effects of national environmental 
scarcity, which often focuses generally on more marketable resources, on conflict and 
violence with literature on the processes of water negotiation and conflict between actors 
in a fairly anarchical situation like states in the international arena.  
As the scope of analysis narrows to a more specific question on water scarcity and 
ethnic conflict, a number of holes emerge in the literature and current understanding. The 
debate over the relative importance of scarcity among other factors, and more specifically 
different types of scarcity, lacks consensus as a whole but may benefit greatly from more 
targeted analysis into specific interactions of political-economic and scarcity factors. 
Exploration into causal mechanism demands further attention so as to not over or 
underestimate the real impact of scarcity in various contexts (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). 
The literature also suffers from a lack of variety in terms of scale of conflict, as most 
examine fairly significant thresholds that might conceal lower, though significant, levels 
of conflict such as riots and protests (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). In addition, the 
literature largely overlooks the potential interaction of different drivers of scarcity and the 
political, social, and economic context that may affect outcomes, such as the more 
sinister link between institutions, structural scarcity, and ethnic marginalization (Gizelis 
2010). Though a large-scale analysis of such interactions may be tedious, examination of 
patterns in though cases may reveal salient political aspects of the discussion. 
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Furthermore, there are obvious challenges that have plagued the analysis of 
previous studies and will likely limit the thoroughness of this one as well. Namely, 
appropriate and sufficient data is lacking for large-scale examinations of unequal 
distribution of water resources within nations, as most data is collected on the state level 
(Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). Many previous studies, such as Gizelis and Wooden (2010), 
recognize the difficulty in examining sub-national variations in water scarcity and 
maintain it outside of the scope of analysis for the sake of simplicity. Sambanis (2001) 
laments that in order to more fully understand the causes of ethnic conflict as a subset of 
civil war, more group-specific “measures of inequality, political representation, and 
wealth distribution as well as territorial concentration of ethnic groups” should be 
collected. Nevertheless, the potential significance of this distributional inequity within a 
state as a determining factor of water scarcity’s role in domestic conflict likely 
necessitates that any attempt at thorough examination takes each nation’s unique 
distribution and causes of scarcity into account.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
In order to examine the effect of water scarcity on the prevalence of domestic 
conflict, it is necessary to identify the role that water plays in the decision-making of 
relevant actors in this domestic situation. Though water is an inescapable necessity for 
the physical and economic health of all actors, it holds different meanings and purposes 
to each. These interests may conflict subtly or significantly, exacerbating the existing 
divides between competing groups. The incentives to capture resources for self-
protection are high when resources are both necessary and of scarce or uncertain useable 
amounts, and the effects of such scarcity can also have social effects triggering the 
increase of perceived and authentic grievances. It is useful to examine these incentives in 
terms of a government-centric or non-state actors-centric view. 
 
Government Logic 
The state, which by default should have ultimate control of its territorial water 
resources, is generally expected to oversee the usage and distribution of water. States can 
be assumed to want these resources to ensure industry and agricultural economic growth, 
public health, and possibly political favors through increased private allocations. In any 
water-scare nations, grievances are likely to exist because of the low growth and quality 
of life that inadequate water supplies often mean. This is a common phenomenon that 
does not adequately explain the impact of water on conflict. However, when a state is 
also characterized by significant social divides, the incentive of the state to create a 
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structural scarcity, by preferentially allocating more water to certain groups than others, 
increases in order to secure dominance and disenfranchise groups with competing 
political goals. In a water-scarce situation, this treatment may include improved 
infrastructure in areas dominated by this group and lacking infrastructure in areas mostly 
composed of members of out-groups. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that the only 
ethnic grievance measure somewhat significant to their analysis of conflict emergence 
was the existence of a strong ethnic dominance, which in this context may indicate a 
strong political incentive to prioritize resources among the dominant ethnic group. As 
opposed to in water abundant societies, the scarcity of the water increases its values to the 
receivers and represents a relative deprivation to those without access.  
Should individuals or groups manage their concerns over water with the 
government via lobbying and appropriate political processes, there is little need to resort 
to conflict. However, when the state cannot or will not adequately provide the resources 
the non-state actors demand, or when initiating a conflict under the banner of water-
related grievances is in the interests of a group, groups may challenge the state or other 
non-state actors for control of the resource. For the purposes of this research, this 
designation includes existing ethnic groups, organized political opposition, as well as 
entrepreneurs representing an asymmetric insurgency against the state or another group. 
These actors, defined by elements of their structure, methods, and goals, are similarly 
distinguishable by their unique sets of interests. 
The interests of the state may be principally concerned with the maintenance of 
power and the prevention of internal or external threats to its authority. Domestically, the 
state’s response to threats differs greatly according to the regime’s type and the extent to 
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which it is responsive to the needs or pressures of the population at large. Democracies 
generally handle opposition through political processes and representation. Autocracies, 
on the other hand, generally enact hard line policies against dissent (Hegre, et al. 2001). 
Autocracies face much lower fears of political overturn so long as they maintain 
sufficient favor, and are therefore less responsive to public concerns than private interests 
and pursuit of state goals. For this reason, they have greater latitude in their policies, 
particularly of the discriminatory variety. However, the fact that autocracies are often 
slow to change without conflict incentivizes both the state and opposition to more quickly 
resort to violence to either prevent or incite change, respectively.   
States of both types are also beholden to the threat of outside forces, from the 
threat of meaningful - though generally unenforceable - international resolutions, to 
sanctions, to interventions in domestic affairs (Evans and Sanhoun, 2002). Therefore, it is 
in the interest of the state to abstain from, or at least conceal, the committing of acts that 
would draw negative attention or reprimand from the international community. In the 
event that violence occurs, the state is motivated to not only protect its power and 
authority but to use the opportunity of mutual conflict to secure a decisive victory, if 
possible, and discourage dissent with harsher methods than are allowable during relative 
peace. Though their incentives and methods differ, both democratic and autocratic state 
leaders are ultimately concerned with the maintenance of power, a motivation which 
often implies currying favor with certain groups at others’ expense (Haggard and Hendrix 
2015). Due to the popularly-enforced limitations on democratic governments versus the 
limited receptiveness of autocratic governments, a hypothesis of the relationship between 
regime type and the likelihood of conflict in this context emerges: 
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H1. Autocratic governments facing water scarcities and social divisions are more 
likely to experience conflict than democratic regimes. 
 
Non-State Actor Logic 
On the other hand, non-state actors, typically with significantly less power than 
the state itself, are generally governed by much weaker restraints on their latitude of 
policy and actions. Their goals differ significantly, which complicates generalizations of 
their actions, though the existing literature has indicated a number of noteworthy 
understandings and it is necessary to make a number of assumptions on how they may 
respond in similar ways. Organized oppositions, meaning here those among non-state 
actors that are most centralized and politically-oriented, can be considered the combatants 
in a traditional two-sided civil war against the state. These groups, often separatists or 
cohesive political opposition to the current powers, are incentivized to seek legitimacy 
and bargaining power in order to achieve wide-scale goals. One can assume that an 
organized opposition is motivated by causes shared among a significant portion of the 
population, though this is a broad description. This assumption points towards shared 
grievances and issues of relative deprivation as motivators, including ethnic or nationalist 
emotions and perceived or real discrimination by the state. A number of psychological 
and socio-economic factors interplay to cause an opposition to act, including the security, 
information, and credible commitment problems that prevent meaningful negotiation and 
increase the likelihood of violence. However, the distinguishing aspect of this type of 
non-state actor is its organized character and motive to capture land, resources, and 
political power. 
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Conflicts between ethnic groups, on the other hand, may or may not have a 
national policy focus. Ethnic groups clash on a variety of scales, from isolated violence 
between members of different groups to separatism or outright civil war. Though these 
conflicts have traditionally been attributed to ancient hatreds, a more rational approach 
based on grievance and greed is more compelling for examining how psychological and 
political-economic motives incentivize the move to violence. Particularly in nations with 
weakened national sovereignty, relatively autonomous ethnic groups may clash with the 
state or each other over territory, resources, and nationally representative power. Such 
conflicts are often provoked by entrepreneurs within a group who propagate fear and 
ideas of perceived security threats, and therefore use information breakdowns and 
uncertainties to their advantage. If their cause is to be successful, it is necessary to build a 
sustainable support base. Therefore, spreading ideas of universally condemnable actions 
by the adversary among group members is a significant potential source of support. It is 
not necessary for such accusations to be true, but only believable enough.  
Lastly, a similar type of entrepreneurs, insurgents, may take a different approach 
but respond to lack of government provision in a similar way. Whether ethnically, 
politically, or economically motivated, insurgencies generally take the form of 
asymmetric conflict. The diminished reliance on an active support base led Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) to find that their emergence in a conflict is 
most highly correlated with opportunities to conduct an effective insurgency, such as a 
weak state and large population, rather than the level of grievances existent in the society. 
Water scarcities provide such opportunities in a number of ways. For one, water scarcity, 
particularly acute drought, can reduce economic opportunities such as farming and 
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herding and therefore increase poverty and lower the opportunities costs of recruitment. 
Secondly, the capture of scarce water access points can be a lucrative opportunity to 
charge civilians for an essential resource and thus fund violence. In a more general sense, 
water scarcity and its economic effects could potentially weaken the state’s capacity to 
deal with rebellion effectively and incentivize groups to try violent means. 
Though ethnic division appears to be less of a predictor than opportunity for 
insurgency, rebellions that fall along ethnic lines may be increasingly divisive and certain 
reveal the existence of salient divides in a nation. Such insurgencies generally have goals 
unsustainable for the nation at large, and serve more to disrupt the status quo that to usher 
in a revolution. Often long and bloody, insurgencies typically have narrow goals to which 
greed may the greatest driver, such as control over areas of a nation that contains 
lucrative resources or warding off government control in order to protect illicit businesses 
or practices. Though the ideological or economic motivations of insurgencies are not 
wholly generalizable, in order for an insurgency to sustain itself there are clear 
opportunistic elements that must be present such as the weakened ability of a state to 
combat a rebellion and a source of rebel funding. These factors provide incentives for 
rebels to seize the opportunity to exploit a situation and pursue their goals. 
The incentives and interests of these various actors exists in many, if not all, 
societies, though the question of why some turn violent while others remain peaceful 
remains. The combination of factors that build upon existing tensions and bring them to a 
head is an important explanation for this difference. The current literature suggests that 
this is accounted for by either atypical amounts of greed, grievances, or opportunities 
conducive to the use of violence for political gain, with the most probably being the latter 
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(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003). As an exogenous shock to the 
situation, water scarcity compounds the concerns of these actors in terms of maintaining 
or increasing their current power in a nation and can fuel any of these three motives. In 
many areas, water is beginning to increasingly resemble a nonrenewable resource. Even 
more, the mystery of measuring and understanding groundwater supplies further 
incentivizes groups to act quickly to secure resources before they are gone at an unknown 
time. Though water scarcity is an issue also faced by many societies, it is at the 
intersection of both water security fears and prominent societal divides that these two 
potential instability-generating factors may together foment the existing fears of opposing 
groups and lead to conflict. 
To examine how this may occur, it is necessary to make assumptions of how each 
type of actor may view their relationship to scarce water resources. The impact that 
concerns over water have on the decision-making of each type of actors are necessarily 
highly generalized here in order to simplify the potential connections. Technology, access 
to outside resources, and the severity of scarcity will all factor differently from case to 
case, though the importance of water scarcity, as opposed to sufficient or abundant 
availability, is the inherent uncertainty and competition that it may engender. As 
previously discussed, real and perceived supply, demand, or structurally induced 
scarcities can exacerbate both fears for the future and adversarial feelings towards other 
groups in the state, and therefore threaten the stability and goals of each actor. When 
these individual water-related concerns and interests intersect with those related to the 
goals of states and non-state actors in highly divided societies, the policy preference gap 
may widen, reducing the likelihood that adversarial groups will come to peaceful 
 33 
solutions. When such divisions fall along ethnic lines, the political balance of in and out 
groups may be the determinant of the government’s water allocation preferences 
(Cederman, et al. 2010). In groups, those that control significant power in a state and 
whose interests are represented in government, are better able to have their concerns 
heard and enacted on by the state. Out groups, those that have little government 
representation or are actively excluded from central decision-making power, are less able 
to rely on institutions and government processes to have their needs met. Outgroups may 
therefore be more likely to use extralegal methods to achieve their goals, being that they 
have little trust in the government to deliver on their concerns and may be actively 
threatened by the central government (Cederman, et al. 2010). Therefore, excluded 
groups may fear for their security for the future when they perceive their access to water 
resources are endangered, and seek to act early before discriminatory water distribution is 
entrenched and more difficult to upend. Ethnic dominance, as represented by major 
dominance or monopolization of central government power, represents levels of tension 
between these in groups and out groups. Hence, the second hypothesis: 
H2. Water-scarce states with a strong ethnic dominance will have an increased 
likelihood of domestic conflict. 
States that are scarce in water resources, according to the “ingenuity gap” 
argument, are also likely to be less capable of adapting to the social effects of increasing 
resource insecurity. While this is certainly not true in all cases and likely overshadowed 
by the effects of other factors, it is nevertheless worthwhile to note that weak states, 
whether because of coincidental with scarce water resources, are less able to manage the 
effects of scarce and depleting resources. Less able to adapt to the need for additional 
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technology and to the socio-economic impact of possible scarcity-induced migration, 
these weak states are also as a rule more susceptible to conflict. Combined with the 
presence of strong social divides, migration of water-seeking people into areas with 
increased may generate conflict as well.  
 In contrast to the state, an opposition force has a great incentive to ensure the 
capture of scarce water resources from the state in order to sustain itself. Because it is a 
critical resource to state growth and quality of life, water is a high-stakes prize when it is 
of limited quantity. Control of water access, such as the headwaters of rivers or wells, has 
the potential to be the new “salting of the fields”: that is, to seriously cripple an adversary 
in its ability to provide for itself. Oppositions are certainly subject to state-driven 
structural scarcities, which can increase the motive to act quickly and dramatically to 
secure a first-mover advantage in a conflict and seize critical resources. In particular, the 
presence of autonomous or opposition-held areas within a state often sees the opposition 
and the central governments act more like states in the international anarchical system. 
Though interstate conflict over water resources often leads to cooperation rather than 
conflict, the tether of sovereignty that the state claims over the autonomous region shifts 
the balance of power back to the state and deprives autonomous regions of their power. In 
essence, the state may discriminate against autonomous regions with water resources 
there because of its ability to determine the use of said resources, which it has a more 
legitimate claim on as the central authority. The critical threat of losing access to 
adequate resources incentivizes oppositions to secure said resources for themselves while 
they are able. Therefore, 
 35 
H3: The presence of autonomous or opposition regions in water-scarce states will 
increase the likelihood of conflict. 
This is a similar line of reasoning for insurgency entrepreneurs, which as Fearon 
and Laitin and Collier (2003) and Hoeffler (2004) are more likely to emerge when there 
are conducive conditions for insurgency than when there are simply grievances or 
opportunities for material gain. Generalizing that water-scarce states are often weak states 
with loose governance, insurgencies may have an opportunity to form with little 
harassment. The greed-based motive of access to critical areas, as well as the political 
motive of changing policy, can be achieved through capturing water resources. 
Particularly when water resources are scarce and distributed geographically unequally, 
areas that contain access to these resources will be more contentious as they are more 
desirable and likely make a decent tool for putting pressure on the adversary state. 
Furthermore, with water resources becoming increasingly unreliable in many parts of the 
world, the capture and sale of water resources by insurgent groups to local populations 
may be an increasingly attractive source of funding for insurgencies. The geographic 
distribution of water resources is important to the opportunity aspect of an insurgency, 
which is facilitated initially by the presence of significant divides (see H5). Lastly, if a 
population, particularly of a target group, fears that its access will be significantly less in 
the near future and therefore significantly detrimental to its way and quality of life, the 
opportunity costs of fighting versus allowing the discrimination to continue may increase 
the likelihood that conflict will constitute a reasonable measure. This will allow 
insurgency entrepreneurs to exploit the costs of waiting in the popular imagination and 
recruit members. 
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 In societies where ethnic groups constitute a significant way of organizing people, 
and ethnic groups are well-defined, a sense of shared fate can drive groups to conflict to 
protect their interests. The critical importance of water to health and development, in 
concert with its often indeterminate, uncertain availability, makes it a ready issue for 
ethnic entrepreneurs attempting to garner support through fear. When water scarcity 
grievances exist and worry the entrepreneurs’ target support group, they can play on 
existing mistrust of the government and adversarial groups to incite greater antipathy. 
This greed explanation frames water scarcity as an opportunity for small numbers of a 
group to initiate ethnic violence by creating community fears of future insecurity. 
Utilizing the Lake and Rothchild (1996) framework for explaining ethnic conflict, these 
entrepreneurs and activists for the ethnic cause, whatever their motivation, can indeed 
create a security dilemma over water. The uncertain nature of availability and other 
groups’ usage of a shared resource can quickly generate information problems and 
problems of credible commitments to not pollute, overuse, or hoard water from other 
users.  
 Taking the grievances argument for conflict, ethnic groups may indeed by 
unequally affected by water scarcities either through supply/demand or structural factors. 
In the first case, real or perceived deprivation of water resources relative to other groups 
may motivate competition between ethnic groups. As opposed to measuring dominance 
in central government, polarization examines a more diffuse measure of the society as a 
whole and the potential for competition between various ethnic groups in society. In 
societies where ethnic groups are significantly polarized, as opposed to simply 
heterogeneous, they may act more like state in an anarchical situation and therefore suffer 
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increasingly from the effects of a security dilemma and information problems (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004). Therefore,  
H4. Water-scarce states with strong ethnic polarization have a greater likelihood 
of experiencing ethnic civil conflict. 
A number of situational factors also represent the juncture of scarcity and societal 
divides. For one, societies that contain major divides have often seen them emerge as a 
result of previous instability or conflict, and it is commonly understood that the time 
since last conflict episode is a strong predictor of the likelihood of future conflict. 
Bringing in Homer-Dixon’s (1998) concept of the ingenuity gap it a slightly different 
manner, it is reasonable to assume that societies significantly divided and suffering from 
the socio-economic, political, and infrastructural effects of recent conflict are less capable 
of effectively cooperating on scarce resource distribution. In such a case, it is likely that 
competition over water resources and the land containing them will be a motivator for 
combatants to reignite conflict, particularly when lack of development prevents the 
acquisition of adequate resources from outside options. As previously described, the 
potential information, security, and credible commitment problems that uncertain water 
resources may generate would be even more impactful in the context of a recent conflict. 
Therefore, another hypothesis emerges: 
H5. Societies with both a recent history of civil conflict and a water scarcity issue 
are increasingly likely to return to conflict than those with one factor or the other.  
Opposition to discriminatory provision of water by the state, a form of structural 
scarcity, is a large part of this theory and a claim that may be taken up by any of the non-
state actors discussed above. Whether based on ethnic or socioeconomic discrimination 
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or the inequitable allocation of water for state, rather than public, use, grievance-based 
arguments relevant to all of the actors emerge. On the other hand, the greed-based 
argument for capturing this necessary and potentially lucrative resource and the land it is 
accessible from also provides an explanation for initiating conflict. When a state relies 
heavily on groundwater, access to water generally concentrated at those few points that 
can tap into the resource. Wells and treatment centers represent these points, and their 
immobile nature may incentivize capture of areas containing them. Similarly, because of 
the hidden an often-inaccessible quality of groundwater as opposed to surface water, 
information problems, lack of credible commitments to not overuse shared water, and the 
security dilemma associated with gaining an advantage by reneging on difficult-to 
monitor agreements may be common. This uncertainty incentivizes non-state and state 
actors to ensure control of as large of a portion of the land containing water as possible at 
the exclusion of others. This valuable land may draw significant competition because of 
the difficult to calculate, though potentially dire, consequences of being shut out. 
Therefore,  
H6. Water-scarce and divided states with a disproportional reliance on 
groundwater will have a greater likelihood of conflict.  
While the existence of a water scarcity issue may have quite different or 
diminished impacts in other contexts, the context of existing societal divides discussed 
here looks at a very specific intersection of two issues.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The empirical testing of these hypotheses requires the aggregation of data from 
numerous sources in order to create an appropriate, thorough, and unique dataset. This 
dataset, which includes the whole world in country-year format from 1958-2010, also 
contains a number of variables generated specifically for this analysis from the initial 
sets.  
The dependent variables observed in this analysis are the onsets of nonviolent or 
violent campaigns in a given country-year. These variables were generated from the 
NAVCO 2.0 Project Dataset’s measures for the onset of a campaign, as well as the 
primary method of action taken during that campaign in a given country-year, either 
violent or nonviolent. This allowed for examination of the conditions related to the initial 
onset of a campaign, as well as the empirical differences in impact of various 
independent variables on the type of campaign that emerges.  
The independent variables in this testing varied widely according to the 
construction of each hypothesis and are all sourced from the FAO Aquastat Database. 
Due to the five-year range of data in the Aquastat database, for example there would be 
one value for the years 1958-1962, the data were necessarily expanded to fit a country-
year format. This was accomplished by applying the value for the five-year window to 
every year inside that window, yielding an observance for every year. The Aquastat 
variables representing water measures also varied for the purpose of testing numerous 
types of water scarcity or abundance in a nation. Though creating a variable strictly 
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representing “water scarcity” is a convoluted task and was confounded by missing data, a 
number of variables were used instead to test the relationship between increasing levels 
of water availability and the probability of conflict. The most general of these is total 
renewable water resources per capita, measured in cubic meters/inhabitant/year, which 
demonstrates a range of supply and demand induced pressure on the availability of water 
as a whole. This is also available in a total form for each country. In order to test a more 
dynamic measure of water availability in countries as opposed to having each recording 
repeated five times, a new variable was created to measure the five-year difference in the 
total renewable water available in a nation for a given year.  To generate this, each 
observance for total renewable water resources was subtracted from the observance five 
years prior. Therefore, a negative value for the difference variable would indicate an 
overall reduction in the total amount of renewable water available in a country. Thus, a 
greater negative difference indicates greater supply-induced scarcity on the total water 
availability.  
A more nuanced representation of scarcity is total freshwater withdrawal per 
capita, also in m3/inhabitant/year, which measures real availability of useable water. This 
variable may be interpreted in a number of ways. For one, increased withdrawals 
indicates greater real access to water for inhabitants of a nation. This shows that more 
water is accessed successfully, reducing scarcity in terms of structural or access-restricted 
supply scarcity, for instance where groundwater is the main source. On the other hand, 
increased withdrawals also represent demand-induced scarcity, as it could indicate that a 
nation’s withdrawals are overexploiting existing resources. Similar to the first 
interpretation of withdrawals, percent of total population with access to safe drinking 
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water represents availability more relevant to domestic resources than agricultural 
withdrawals, in an attempt to capture a measure closely related to potential popular 
grievances. Finally, the withdrawal-induced pressure on available resources is 
represented by freshwater withdrawal as a percentage of total renewable water 
resources, which indicates greater pressure on resources as the percentage increases.  
In additions to the water measures, this analysis uses a number of measures from 
the Ethnic Power Relations project to test the impact of ethnic fractionalization, 
exclusion, and discrimination in concert with the water measures on conflict onset. The 
most general measures for this include linguistic fractionalization and number of 
ethnopolitically relevant groups. These variables generally indicate whether a society is 
more homogenous or heterogeneous in its ethnolinguistic makeup and the number of 
ethnic groups for which, according to the EPR codebook, “at least one significant 
political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, 
or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated 
against in the domain of public politics.” These measures aid the analysis by allowing 
analytical comparisons of the importance of fractionalization and the number of 
potentially competitive groups in a society versus the impact of water scarcity on the 
onset of conflict. 
Following this, the numbers of included groups and excluded groups as well as 
the size of the excluded population relative to total population represent the relative 
power of included and excluded groups in a nation. Included groups are those included in 
central political power, while excluded groups generally do not have access to 
government power. The numbers of these groups help test whether larger or smaller 
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numbers of each affect the outcome, while the percentage of excluded population in the 
total population helps to test the hypothesis that greater ethnic dominance and political 
exclusion increases the likelihood of conflict onset. 
The percentages of the total population of discriminated population, powerless 
population, only local power separatist population, dominant population, and monopoly 
population were similarly used to test for probability changes relative to variation in 
these specific measures. According to the EPR codebook, discriminated populations face 
active, intentional, and targeted exclusion from central and regional power, while 
powerless populations face exclusion from power without being actively discriminated 
against. These are used to differentiate the possible impacts of active discrimination from 
a dominant group versus other reasons for lack of access to power. The only local power 
separatist population variable, which represents groups with secessionist intent and only 
local or regional power, is used to test whether the existence of significant percentages of 
the population in this category would positively affect the likelihood of conflict, as was 
the prediction of the theory. Monopoly population and dominant population are those in 
which elite members hold exclusive power or near-exclusive power at the executive 
level, respectively. This theory predicts that lower percentages of these measures, 
excepting zero percent, would indicate high levels of ethnic power concentration and 
engender increased discrimination with scarce resources. Lastly, the EPR variable 
number of peace years since a previous conflict controlled for the effects of recent 
conflict on the outcome of the dependent variables.   
All models included standard control variables for political structure, 
development, and population. The control polity2, the combined Polity2 scores from the 
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Polity IV dataset ranging from full democracy (10) to autocracy (-10), represents the 
level of democracy in a nation and its impact on the potential for conflict. Polity2 also 
allowed for the creation of dummy variables for democratic and autocratic nations, which 
were used in the testing of Hypothesis 1. Gross Domestic Product per capita (lagged) 
controls for the impact of development and economic growth on conflict onset outcomes, 
as increased GDP is associated with greater stability Finally, the log of population in each 
country-year is used as a control for the effect of population growth on conflict onset, as 
the two may be positively correlated. Controlling for these variables helps to show a 
clearer relationship between the water and ethnic division variables and conflict onset.  
Analysis of this data took place in R using logit analysis of interacting and non-
interacting variables. Though all of these variables factored into the analysis, many 
produced insignificant results and are therefore excluded from the discussion of more 
relevant findings. It should also be noted that although the dataset covers the whole world 
from 1946-2010, many models ran on subsets of the data based on the Ethnic Power 
Relation designation of North Africa/Middle East nations and Sub-Saharan African 
nations in order to examine regional influences on the issue of water and ethnic divisions. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 The results of this analysis demonstrate a number of interesting relationships 
between measures of water availability and various social and ethnic division measures 
on the onset of conflict. For the majority of these tests, the results for violent onsets are 
more likely to show significance than nonviolent onsets. Though these were also tested, 
they are generally excluded from the tables due to their lack of significant relationships 
and usefulness for comparison.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
 In order to test Hypothesis 1, I used models 1, 2, 3, and 4. Like all other models, 
these included controls for polity, which was squared in this case, gross domestic product 
(GDP) in logged form, and the logged population for a given country-year. These models 
attempted to examine the relationship between government type, in particular autocracy, 
and the amount of water available in a nation according to different measures of access. 
These measures, which include total renewable water resources per capita, total water 
withdrawal per capita, and total population percentage with access to safe drinking water, 
aim to test varied ways in which the overall availability of water in a nation or the ability 
of a nation to extract and provide access to water resources affects conflict onset 
outcomes. These varied measures are used throughout this analysis in comparable models 
to test potential differences between supply-, demand-, and structurally-induced scarcity 
and pressure on water resources. 
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The models for this hypothesis unfortunately show little significance for either 
measures of water. Models 1 through 3 display interactions between autocracy dummy 
variables and water measures and show no significance with the interaction or the 
individual variables. Interactions such as appear here and in further models add to the 
analysis by testing whether the variable produce a different outcome in concert than they 
do individually. In other words, whether the variables affect one another and in what 
direction this effect alters the dependent variable outcome. 
However, the one model without an interaction, 4, shows slight significance for 
the total water withdrawal per capita per year variable. Interestingly, the coefficient for 
this variable, .001 is positive. Whereas according to the hypothesis the more water 
available in a country-year the lesser the chance of conflict, this model suggests the 
opposite. This model suggests instead that a greater amount of water withdrawn per 
capita per year contributes to a slight increase in the likelihood of conflict. In addition to 
the other models for this hypothesis that showed no quantitative significance, this 
particular observation contradicts the theory that led to this hypothesis and does not 
support the hypothesis. One potential explanation for this positive coefficient, which is 
fairly weak to begin with, is the impact of data missingness on the accuracy of this test. 
With unfortunately large parts of the Aquastat database missing observances for whole 
variables or intermittently throughout the country-years, it is possible that the test is not 
comprehensive of the whole world and therefore may produce a falsely positive result 
based on the limited data available. 
Another potential explanation lies in questions of allocation that are not captured 
in this analysis, and in particular the distribution and allocation of withdrawn water 
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among competing sectors and parties. In essence, the problem may lie in the steps taken 
post-withdrawal that contribute to increased competition, particularly in autocratic 
societies in which an increase in water withdrawal may be associated with a more clearly 
preferential allocation that in effect contributes to structural scarcity for some despite an 
overall increase in withdrawal. 
Table 1  
 Violent Campaign Onset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Polity2 0.062 0.130 0.078 0.127 
 (0.039) (0.124) (0.065) (0.123) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.155*** -0.138** -0.208* -0.138** 
 (0.038) (0.059) (0.113) (0.060) 
Population (logged) 0.197*** 0.304* 0.040 0.310** 
 (0.075) (0.159) (0.151) (0.157) 
Democracy (0/1) -1.059** -0.659 -1.803** -0.632 
 (0.436) (1.115) (0.821) (1.105) 
Autocracy (0/1) 0.141 0.985 0.501 0.850 
 (0.387) (1.381) (1.543) (1.251) 
Total renewable water resources per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year) 0.00000 
   
 (0.00000)    
     
Autocracy: Total renewable water resources per 
capita (m3/inhabitant/year) -0.00001 
   
 (0.00001)    
Total water withdrawal per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year) 
 0.001  0.001*** 
  (0.001)  (0.0002) 
Autocracy: Total water withdrawal per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year) 
 -0.0001   
  (0.001)   
Total population with access to safe drinking 
water (%) 
  -0.009  
   (0.014)  
   Violent Campaign Onset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Autocracy: Total population with access to safe 
drinking water (%) 
  0.005  
   (0.022)  
Constant -5.232*** -7.859*** -3.462** -7.842*** 
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 (0.741) (1.670) (1.606) (1.668) 
Observations 6,486 2,418 3,142 2,418 
Log Likelihood -443.216 -81.990 -142.035 -82.016 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 902.432 179.980 300.069 178.031 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 postulates a relationship between societies with strong indicators for 
ethnic dominance will be more likely to experience conflict when they also show signs of 
water scarcity than when they have greater amounts of available water. In order to test 
Hypothesis 2, I use models 5, 6, 7, and 8 using the variables dominant population (%), 
monopoly population (%), and excluded groups (number) to represent levels of exclusion 
and dominance. The water variables included in this table, total water withdrawal per 
capita (m3/inhabitant/year) and total renewable water resources per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year) showed the strongest relationships of tested water measures for this 
analysis and provide comparison between the representations of water availability. The 
dependent variable in this test was restricted to violent campaign onset, given that the 
nonviolent campaign tests yielded insignificant results. 
The most notable model from this hypothesis is 5, which tests water withdrawal 
per capita and dominant population percentage separately and as an interaction. Total 
water withdrawal per capita is significant by itself in this test with a coefficient of 0.001 
(p= 0.00009), and the interaction with dominant population is significant with coefficient 
-0.003 (p=0.079). Again, total water withdrawal per capita gives surprising results in that 
it is significant and positive, indicating that when the other variables are held constant, 
increases in total water withdrawal per capita contribute to and increased likelihood of 
conflict. This does not support the hypothesis, but may be attributed to factors not 
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captured by this test or by data issues such as missingness. The interaction also yields an 
interesting result, as the significant and negative coefficient suggests that as water 
withdrawals per capita increase along with a share of the population that is considered to 
be in the dominant group, these two variables interact to decrease the likelihood of 
conflict. This perhaps suggests that the greater the share of the population that identifies 
with that group, the less that other groups are willing or able to engage in a violent 
conflict against the dominant population. This may be particularly true when adequate 
access to water resources reduces competition or the need to revolt against a dominant 
population. As this hypothesis would suggest that the smaller the proportion of the total 
population that is considered “dominant,” the more likely that conflict would occur 
because of unfair power concentration, this interaction result somewhat supports the 
hypothesis. The more equal power relations are across a larger proportion of the 
population, in addition to adequate water provisions, it may be anticipated that such a 
society may be more egalitarian with its water resource distribution and therefore reduce 
both grievance and greed (opportunistic) motives to engage in violence. 
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Table 2 
 Violent campaign onset 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.119* -0.157*** -0.125* -0.129** 
 (0.062) (0.039) (0.064) (0.064) 
     
Polity2 0.037 0.007 0.042 0.037 
 (0.043) (0.018) (0.046) (0.048) 
     
Population (logged) 0.279* 0.218*** 0.368** 0.345* 
 (0.168) (0.072) (0.174) (0.201) 
     
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.454 0.054 -0.333 0.161 
 (1.138) (0.377) (1.095) (1.093) 
     
Dominant population (%) 2.109 -0.835*   
 (1.310) (0.501)   
     
Monopoly population (%)   -3.322  
   (2.689)  
     
Excluded groups (number)    0.092 
    (0.110) 
     
Total water withdrawal per capita (m3/inhabitant/year) 0.001***  0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.001) 
     
Dominant population: Total water withdrawal per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year) -0.003
*    
 (0.001)    
     
Total renewable water resources per capita (m3/inhabitant/year)  0.00000   
  (0.00000)   
     
Dominant population: Total renewable water resources per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year)  0.00001   
  (0.00001)   
     
Monopoly population: Total water withdrawal per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year)   0.003  
   (0.002)  
     
Excluded groups: Total water withdrawal per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year)    -0.0002 
    (0.0002) 
     
Constant -8.255*** -5.618*** -8.124*** -8.443*** 
 (1.876) (0.731) (1.842) (2.016) 
Observations 2,414 6,469 2,414 2,414 
Log Likelihood -78.906 -438.007 -81.145 -81.769 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 173.812 892.014 178.289 179.538 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 supposes a relationship between the existence of separatist or 
autonomous areas in a state and lower levels of water availability that increases the 
likelihood of conflict. Testing Hypothesis 3 with the standard control variables, different 
measures of water resources, and the Ethnic Power Relations data for only local power 
population (%) and only local power separatist population (%) yielded two most 
promising models, 9 and 10. These models interacted these variables with the water 
variables, yielding unreliable and insignificant results. Therefore, these models suggest 
that the variables do not work together to constitute any synergistic effects on the 
likelihood of conflict. 
 However, similar to the results of the Hypothesis 1 models, these models also 
suggest that an increase in total water withdrawals per capita has a slight positive effect 
on the likelihood of conflict, with a rounded 0.001 coefficient in both cases and 0.0890 p 
value for 9 and a 0.00961 p value for 10. Again, this may be due to the data or other 
factors. Perhaps an increase in water withdrawals demonstrates more water available per 
capita, but it may also represent stress on resources that affect conflict outcomes but is 
not explicitly visible in these models. However, this model demonstrates that there is no 
reason to expect a consistent quantitative relationship between the presence of large local 
power or local power separatist populations and water availability increasing the 
likelihood of conflict. 
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Table 3 
 Violent campaign onset 
 (9) (10) 
GDP per capita (logged)  -0.121* -0.132** 
 (0.062) (0.064) 
   
Polity2 0.063 0.035 
 (0.048) (0.045) 
   
Population (logged) 0.316* 0.385** 
 (0.164) (0.173) 
   
Only local power separatist population (%) 8.815  
 (6.732)  
   
Only local power population (%)  -1.675 
  (10.154) 
   
Ethnic fractionalization 0.093 -0.230 
 (1.106) (1.033) 
   
Total water withdrawal per capita (m3/inhabitant/year) 0.001* 0.001*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
   
Only local power separatist population: Total water withdrawal per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year) 0.001  
 (0.004)  
   
Only local power population: Total water withdrawal per capita (m3/inhabitant/year)  -0.008 
  (0.023) 
   
Constant -8.039*** -8.330*** 
 (1.778) (1.810) 
Observations 2,414 2,414 
Log Likelihood -79.671 -81.742 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 175.341 179.483 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 
 According to Hypothesis 4, an increase in water availability should negatively 
impact conflict outcome probability, whereas an increase in ethnic polarization or an 
interaction between low levels of water availability and high divisiveness should increase 
the likelihood of a violent campaign onset. With violent campaign onset as the dependent 
variable, models 11, 12, and 13, tested total water withdrawal per capita (109m3/year), 
total renewable water resources per capita (109m3/year), and total population with access 
to safe drinking water (%) as water measures, and used ethnic fractionalization and 
number of ethnopolitically relevant groups to represent social fractionalization.  
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Though these and similar models not included in the chart tested various independent and 
interacting variables of water availability and ethnopolitical divisiveness, none of the 
models returned significant results. Despite being insignificant and therefore unreliable, it 
is interesting that some of the water measures returned coefficients counterintuitive to the 
theory. Increasing access to drinking water returned a negative coefficient as expected 
(coefficient = -0.022, p= 0.136), though increasing withdrawal and total resources per 
capita again increased the likelihood of a violent outcome.  
Overall, these results do not uphold the hypothesis as presented with either independent 
or interacting variables representing water availability and social fractionalization. While 
there may be anecdotal examples in history of an interaction between these factors, there 
appears to be no observable quantitative relationship here that would add to the accuracy 
of predictive models for this interaction. 
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Table 4 
 Violent Conflict Onset 
 (11) (12) (13) 
GDP Per Capita (logged) -0.134** -0.158*** -0.206* 
 (0.065) (0.040) (0.114) 
Polity2 0.048 0.009 -0.042 
 (0.047) (0.018) (0.036) 
Population (log) 0.293 0.140 -0.001 
 (0.226) (0.097) (0.189) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.309 0.280 -1.315 
 (1.461) (0.434) (2.371) 
Number of ethnopolitically relevant groups 0.009 0.015 0.030 
 (0.038) (0.017) (0.032) 
Total water withdrawal per capita (109m3/year) 0.001   
 (0.001)   
Ethnic Fractionalization: Total water withdrawal per 
capita (109m3/year) -0.001 
  
 (0.002)   
Total renewable water resources per capita 
(109m3/year) 
 0.00001  
  (0.00001)  
Ethnic Fractionalization: Total renewable water 
resources per capita (109m3/year) 
 -0.00001  
  (0.00001)  
Total population with access to safe drinking water (%)   -0.022 
   (0.020) 
    
Ethnic Fractionalization: Total population with access 
to safe drinking water 
  0.017 
   (0.036) 
Constant -7.841*** -5.191
*** -2.487 
 (2.245) (0.901) (2.025) 
Observations 2,414 6,469 3,129 
Log Likelihood -82.217 -439.182 -139.980 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 180.433 894.363 295.960 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 expects that lower levels of water availability, in concert with lower 
number of peace years since last conflict, will contribute to an increasing likelihood of 
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conflict. Models 14, 15, 16, and 17 look at various measures of water availability (total 
water withdrawal per capita (109m3/year), total renewable water resources per capita 
(109m3/year), and total population with access to safe drinking water (%)) along with the 
number of peace years since last conflict and various control variables including binary 
representations of a nation’s location in the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa. In this 
case, there was reason to include an interesting model with nonviolent campaign onset as 
the dependent variable, as this model showed significance for this interaction.  
In general, these models showed little in support of the hypothesis. Though 14 
showed the positive coefficient for total water withdrawals per capita observed in other 
models with a modest significance (p = 0.0765), 14 and 15 showed little significance in 
the results. In mod.h5b, which tested total renewable resources per capita and an 
interaction of this variable with number of peace years, both being in the Middle East 
(coefficient = 0.851, p = 0.0088) and having fewer peace years (coefficient = -.0351, p = 
0.002550) had strong significance for the likelihood of conflict, though the water measure 
was insignificant and this relationship could likely be explained by other factors unrelated 
to water. 
However, 16 and 17 showed interesting results for peace years and access to safe 
drinking water. These models are identical except for the dependent variable, for which 
16 is violent and for 17 is nonviolent campaign onset. Both models showed that an 
interaction between number of peace years and the percentage of the population with 
access to safe drinking water produced a negative effect on the likelihood of either 
violent or nonviolent conflict with the same coefficient of -0.002. Though the test for 
nonviolent conflict was more significant in this case, both models support the hypothesis 
 55 
that fewer years of peace and more scarce access to water contribute to an increased 
likelihood of civil conflict. This is intuitive, as both measures are often associated with 
the weakness or strength of a state. This also demonstrates the impact of structural and 
supply-induced scarcity, as the lack of drinking water is likely a combination of both 
physical availability of the resources and the ability of states or communities within them 
to exploit these resources. However, this relationship may be more related in actuality to 
the strength of a state following a conflict, for in that time a state may or may not have 
the capacity to repair critical infrastructure such as water distribution systems. Water 
distribution infrastructure may serve as a weak representation of state capacity in this 
sense, but it appears that the conflict outcome may depend more particularly on the 
capability of the state to engage in projects like water infrastructure building that it does 
on the availability of water itself.  
Table 5 
 Violent campaign onset Nonviolent campaign onset 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) 
 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.131 -0.167*** -0.241* -0.030 
 (0.084) (0.045) (0.136) (0.047) 
     
Polity2 0.068 0.017 -0.032 -0.057* 
 (0.057) (0.018) (0.036) (0.030) 
     
Population (logged) 0.184 0.128 0.049 0.279** 
 (0.215) (0.084) (0.168) (0.117) 
     
Number of peace years 0.031 -0.035*** 0.092* 0.183*** 
 (0.041) (0.012) (0.055) (0.046) 
     
North Africa/Middle East (0/1) 1.397* 0.851*** 0.930 -0.992 
 (0.776) (0.325) (0.704) (0.787) 
     
 Violent campaign onset Nonviolent campaign onset 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (0/1) -1.831 -0.207 0.170 -0.677 
 (1.298) (0.303) (0.570) (0.550) 
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Ethnic Fractionalization 0.534 0.342 -0.164 0.789 
 (1.435) (0.457) (0.778) (0.776) 
     
Total water withdrawal per capita (109m3/year) 0.001*    
 (0.0004)    
     
Number of peace years: Total water withdrawal per 
capita (109m3/year)   -0.0002    
 (0.0001)    
     
Total renewable water resources per capita 
(109m3/year)  0.00000   
  (0.00000)   
     
Number of peace years: Total renewable water 
resources per capita (109m3/year)    0.000   
  (0.00000)   
     
Total population with access to safe drinking water 
(%)   0.004 0.020 
   (0.016) (0.017) 
     
Number of peace years: Total population with 
access to safe drinking water (%)   -0.002
* -0.002*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Constant -6.468*** -4.640*** -4.392** -8.596*** 
 (2.248) (0.874) (1.902) (1.738) 
 
Observations 2,418 6,486 3,142 3,142 
Log Likelihood -72.389 -435.588 -140.673 -169.882 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 164.778 891.175 301.346 359.764 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6, which asserts that a higher reliance on groundwater increases the 
uncertainty of resources and therefore incentivizes competition over scarce access points, 
was unfortunately untestable with any validity based on the availability of data. In order 
to test the dependence of violent and nonviolent campaign onset on groundwater 
dependence, a new variable was created to represent the percentage of total freshwater 
withdrawn in a given country-year was of groundwater origin. This was tested with 
polity, GDP per capita, population (log), and ethnic fractionalization as controls. 
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However, the missingness of large quantities of data from the Aquastat dataset degraded 
the validity of this test so as to make it unusable. In this case, it is impossible to 
determine whether the hypothesis is supported or unsupported by the test conducted. 
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES 
 The structure of this analysis begins with the examination of three cases to 
address the questions posed in the introduction. These three cases of the Israel/Palestine, 
Iraq/ISIS, and Sudan Darfur conflicts represent three distinct instances in which water is 
a clearly identified element, if not cause, of conflict. The level of conflict in these 
instances vary from mostly political, to asymmetrical, to all out civil war, demonstrating 
a variety of outcomes in the dependent variable. Therefore, the intent of this paper is not 
to prove a universal causality of water shortages to conflict, but to examine the 
importance of this independent variable in determining the relative importance of water 
issues as a factor in domestic conflict and a variety of ways in which these issues impact 
power and security in a nation. It is important to recognize that although the analysis of 
these cases focuses particularly on the water aspect of each, other socio-political and 
economic factors are recognized to play a major role in conflict onset as well. However, 
since this thesis asserts that water issues, as a large category, do indeed increase conflict 
likelihood through both opportunity and grievance related mechanisms, this analysis has 
a necessarily narrowed scope for examining this issue specifically. 
Though this section studies mostly international cases outside of the United 
States, this issue has major implications for United States and global policy and 
intelligence communities. Therefore, this qualitative section focuses mainly on the 
intelligence and policy value of the trends extracted from these cases and the larger 
analysis. The United States Intelligence Community has increasingly recognized the topic 
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of water conflict in its estimates for emerging problems on the global scale, as a subset of 
the larger concerns of climate change impacts and the effects of depleting global natural 
freshwater resources. The US Intelligence Community acknowledged that these forces 
will in the future increasingly “threat[en] the stability of countries” and “heighten social 
and political tensions” in a number of regions, constituting a direct threat to the state of 
global security in which the US maintains a major interest (US National Intelligence 
Council 2016, 3). This concern is well founded and intimately tied to this paper’s 
discussion, as in the near future water resources will likely only continue to decline as a 
result of human and climatic forces at uncertain rates and with unclear consequences, 
thereby adding an imperative to this research. Hence, there are clear national security 
implications to this study, as it may provide better predictive insights into the ways in 
which water scarcity contributes to the destabilization of nations and regions by drawing 
out trends from both the abstract theoretical analysis of water and conflict and existing 
case studies on the matter. It is the intent of this thesis to contribute to the understanding 
of what intelligence is necessary to mitigate dangerous interactions of these factors and 
avenues for the intelligence community to manage associated future risks. This is 
accomplished by the following analysis of the cases to which we now turn. 
 
Israel and Palestine 
Perhaps the most generally well-known of these three cases, the Israel-Palestine 
situation has long been haunted by a less visible specter than outright violence: disputes 
over the right to water that flows unconfined between the regions. The issues here are 
manifold and convoluted, with each side manipulating the public perception of the 
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situation to demonize the other. Israel blames the Palestinians for failing to create 
institutions effective enough to provide water to their people (The Issue of Water...”). 
The Palestinians blame Israel for embedding discriminatory provisions in the water 
sharing process and using its control over the resources to stifle Palestinian development 
(“Palestinian Water Sector”). In either view, and there is some truth to both, water has 
remained a major sticking point in negotiations between the parties and contributed to 
socioeconomic changes that could threaten the security of the area. 
Figure 1: Map of the West Bank
 
 
Israel and the West Bank share the Jordan River as well as the Mountain Aquifer 
that lies underneath both territories and provides freshwater in the absence of significant 
yearly rainfall (Kiser 2000). Israel and the Palestinian territories both depend extensively 
Figure 1: This map combines 
a UN map with a rough 
approximation of the line 
between the Eastern and 
Western Mountain Aquifers. 
Clearly, the Eastern aquifer 
that was allocated by the 
Oslo Accords for the 
exploitation of Palestinians 
lies predominately in Israeli-
controlled Area C, 
preventing much effective 
usage of this limited and 
degrading resource. 
(Adapted from:  
Knell, Yolande. "Stifled West Bank 
Economy Drains Palestinians' Hopes." BBC 
News. BBC, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 01 Apr. 
2017 and Swagerty, Ted. 
"Israel/Palestine/Jordan – EcoPeace/Friends 
of the Earth Middle East and the Good 
Water Neighbors Project."  The Eco 
Tipping Point Project, Apr. 2014. Web. 01 
Apr. 2017). 
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on these groundwater resources, with the West Bank sourcing 98 percent of its water 
from underground reservoirs (AQUASTAT Israel and Occupied Territories). The 
Mountain Aquifer is hydrologically distinguished between its Western and Eastern 
halves. Though the Eastern part lies almost entirely in the West Bank, the Israeli national 
water company Mekorot heavily exploits it for Israeli use around the nation (“Issues 
Under the Oslo Accords”). To complicate the matter, an expected one-third decrease of 
useable aquifer water due to over pumping and pollution as well as a potential 20 percent 
increase in population by 2050 will further stress the area with supply and demand-
induced scarcity (Chenoweth 2011, 409).  
Though the limited and decreasing water resources are transboundary and 
inseparable, Israel and the Palestinian Authority have long debated the rights of each to 
access the water they share. The latest agreement to that point, the 1995 Oslo Interim 
Agreement – which was intended to last five years but continues to be the rule today – 
solidified the control Israel has effectively held over the aquifer since 1967 (Pendraza and 
Heinrich 2016). Since the 1967 agreement that established the sharing of the West Bank 
territory between the Israelis and Palestinians, Israel has controlled 90 percent of the 
territory’s water resources and all its surface water (Melham 2015). Since the 1995 
Agreement, Israel has claimed 71 percent of the aquifer’s total renewable water 
production, while the West Bank is allocated 17 percent and Jordan receives a percentage 
as part of the agreement as well (Pendraza and Heinrich 2016). About 1370 million cubic 
meters (mcm) of water are shared between the Israeli and Palestinian territories out of the 
total 1800 mcm/year of renewable water available in the territories as a whole. 
Palestinians are only legally able to extract 118 mcm/year of these resources (Hareuveni 
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2012). It is estimated that Israel allocates three to five times the Palestinian share of water 
to Israeli settlements, and that approximately 113,000 Palestinians lack access to water 
distribution networks (Asser and Hass).  
The renewable resources present in the territories could be sufficient for the 
Palestinian and Israeli needs with major efforts to increase efficiency in use and transport 
of water. However, the fact of poor management on the part of the Palestinians, such as 
failure to update and increase the efficiency of distribution systems or manage sewage 
and pollution, makes the meager share they receive insufficient for current and future 
needs (Chenoweth 2011). The huge disparity in allocation of the shared resources is 
echoed by the vastly different access of Israelis and Palestinians to clean water. The 
World Health Organization minimum standard for water access is 100 liters per person 
per day, and although most Israelis can expect this quantity to be available from legal, 
accessible sources without concern, the ability of Palestinians to access sufficient 
quantities of water varies significantly due to spotty infrastructure, degraded wells, and 
restrictions on movement to areas where water is more accessible (“Palestinian Water 
Sector”). 
The present state of water disparity was cemented in The Oslo Agreements in 
1995, which both set the current limits on the quantity and permitted locations of water 
extraction for both parties as well as created the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water 
Committee (JWC) that must unanimously approve all West Bank water projects. This 
agreement allocated 80 percent of the water pumped from the Mountain Aquifer to Israeli 
use and 20 percent to Palestinian use, capping the Palestinian extraction at 200 mcm/year 
(Chenoweth 2011). This allowed the Palestinians to maintain the production of 118 
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mcm/year from existing wells and permitted the extraction of an additional 70-80 
mcm/year but only from the Eastern Mountain Aquifer (Chenoweth 2011). Due to 
insufficient development of water resources, Mekorot sells the Palestinian Authority 
about 50 mcm/year of water from its own extractions for about $50 million per year 
(Melham 2015). This supply plateau severely contributes to the growing gap between 
supply and demand for water in the West Bank. 
The Oslo Agreements also created three zones in the West Bank under different 
levels of Israeli control names Areas A, B, and C. This sectioning further contributes to 
the lack of water resource development, for while the Palestinians are only allowed to 
drill in the Eastern Mountain Aquifer, nearly half of the aquifer lies under Area C, a 
noncontiguous zone entirely under Israeli military control (“Issues Under the Oslo 
Accords”). The restriction of movement in this area prevents Palestinians from accessing 
legal wells, and the combination of prerequisite JWC approval and an additional permit 
to drill wells specific to Area C gives the Israelis a double-veto over a large area of the 
only aquifer section allocated to the Palestinians for development (“Palestinian Water 
Sector”). In combination with the declining water tables at the few wells existing in Area 
C, the growing gap between water supply and access in Area C has driven migration out 
of the area and decreased resistance to further Israeli expansion (Carradin 2016). This 
allows Israel greater opportunity to expand, and increases pressure on already stressed 
urban water systems (Kiser 2000). 
The vastly unequal access of Israelis and Palestinians to water is therefore 
explained by a combination of factors, many of which are likely to worsen in coming 
years, and associated with myriad geopolitical, environmental, and rhetorical elements. 
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Though Israel blames this gap on Palestinian Authority corruption, inefficiency, and 
chronic inaction, the Palestinian Authority points to the use of the JWC to stall approval 
of projects, degradation of the Eastern Aquifer, and restrictions on Palestinian movement 
and drilling into the healthier Western Aquifer (Isaac 1995 and “Issues Under the Oslo 
Accords”). The Eastern Mountain Aquifer, the only part that Palestinians are allowed to 
use according to the agreement, suffers from declining water tables from over-pumping, 
salinization, and pollution from agricultural runoff and fecal matter (Weinberger 2012). 
This degradation contributes to the failure of the Palestinian Authority to complete the 
upgrading of 50 pre-1967 wells and to develop JWC-approved wells less than 150 meters 
deep, allowances made in the Oslo Agreement (Hareuveni 2012). Though the JWC has 
approved 23 well sites since 1995, only one-third of the projects have been completed 
and very few measures to increase efficiency of water distribution in the Palestinian 
Territories have been implemented (Isaac 1995 and Hass 2014). 
This is partly an issue of poor resource management from the Palestinians, though 
it is also a product of Israel’s heavy restrictions on Palestinian access to the aquifer and 
development of independent water infrastructure (Hass 2014). The antiquated West Bank 
water distribution systems are indeed in major need of replacement and repair, and 
although such an overhaul could potentially increase useable water by 40 percent, the 
Palestinian Authority has taken little action (Comair et. al., 2013). As a result, many 
Palestinians without access to regular water have drilled wells into the aquifer, which is 
prohibited in the areas controlled by Israel, or illegally hooked into Israel’s National 
Water Carrier pipeline (Kiser 2000). 
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Whether due to Palestinian inaction, as the Israelis assert, or the strong-arming of 
the Israelis on the JWC to stall project implementation or only approve sub-optimal sites, 
as the Palestinian side complains, the fact remains that existing resources are insufficient 
for the current and growing Palestinian population. This hinders economic development, 
forces Palestinians to spend disproportionate amounts of their household income on water 
(average is 8 percent for Palestinians, 3.5 percent worldwide and around 1 percent for 
Israelis), and is driving populations to more urban areas where water access is cheaper 
and more reliable (“Palestinian Water Sector”).  
Considering the expansion of Israeli settlements and the continued guarantee of 
sufficient water to Israelis, feelings of relative deprivation grow among Palestinians in 
this convoluted situation. Visible and physical demonstrations of Israeli dominance over 
water such as the detonation of three illegal water wells in Hebron City in 2016 has only 
heightened the profile of water as a talking point in this conflict and increased 
accusations of discrimination and unfair treatment from the Palestinians (“Army 
Destroys…” 2016). Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding the Palestinian water 
shortage due to a lack of international precedent for sharing between the entities and 
independent monitoring allows the parties to hide noncompliance behind blame of the 
other. The fact remains, however, that until the Palestinian Authority makes major strides 
with providing access, Palestinians are likely to continue to resort to illegal pumping and 
line tapping that only contributes to the feelings of animosity between the sides over 
water. 
In general, the lack of clear international legal precedent for the allocation of 
water in this situation has allowed Israel wide leeway to utilize water as a tool to control 
 66 
the movement and economic potential of the Palestinians. As a result, increased 
Palestinian movement into urban centers, increased poverty, and increased grievances 
brought about by visible relative deprivation in terms of nearby Israeli settlements, has 
exacerbated existing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians and hindered 
peacemaking efforts. Water is an essential issue to overcome for any agreement between 
the parties. Therefore, any water sharing agreement locking in inequality will be a 
problem for years to come, considering unequal and unpredictable levels of degradation 
and vastly different population growth rates and expectations for per capita water 
availability. This high-profile, unclear issue has led to increasing political conflict over 
water that often plays out in media and official documents as each side uses political and 
rhetorical manipulation of the situation in attempt to create the optimal negotiating stance 
for the future. Each side wants to secure resources for the future, and because water is a 
known sticking point between these sides, neither has incentive to go to the bargaining 
table unless they feel confident in their ability to obtain guarantees of their water rights 
for now and the future. Therefore, water will continue to hinder the establishment of 
peace between Israel and Palestine. 
 
Sudan’s Darfur Conflict 
When the Sudanese Darfur region’s rebel groups, the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), took up arms against the state 
in 2003, a conflict began that has ebbed and flared since, characterized by descriptions of 
genocide and war crimes committed by government-backed Arab-speaking rebel groups. 
Though the war is mostly attributed to grievances of political exclusion of non-Arab 
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communities and a major lack of infrastructure, experts also posit water infrastructure 
failures and environmental issues as key causal elements (“Darfur Conflict” Reuters 
2014). A major drought in Sudan beginning in the 1980s coincided with the 
establishment of a new coup-empowered government in Khartoum in 1989 and the 
abolition of regional dispute-resolution institutions. As a result, drought and 
desertification in the north of Sudan pushed Arab herders into the territory of non-Arab 
farmers and fueled ethnically-charged competition over resources on the land in the 
absence of governing institutions (“Darfur Conflict” Reuters 2014). Though the conflict 
officially ended between the government and rebel forces in 2009, Darfur has continued 
to be ravaged by violence from smaller armed groups fighting over territory (O’Kelly 
2013). 
Sudan is not extremely water scarce on a national level, though the Darfur 
region’s water resources are highly dependent on local climate and seasonal variability, 
and water infrastructure is severely limited (Ali 2015). According to the FAO Aquastat 
data for Sudan, in 2015 only 55 percent of the population had access to improved 
drinking water sources, and in Darfur, this often means a long trek to a communal well to 
gather domestic water every few days (Schlein 2011). Sudan utilizes very little of the 
groundwater resources contained in its borders due to lack of government effort or 
capacity for widespread water access or distribution projects. Additionally, rainfall has 
been traditionally been sufficient for the majority of Sudan’s needs until the droughts 
began. Nevertheless, groundwater is critical in the few areas in which it is used, mostly 
for municipal and drinking purposes. It is a sporadically accessible but crucial resource 
particularly in pastoral areas of Darfur (AQUASTAT “Sudan”). Rain and surface water 
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have historically been the most accessible and utilized form of the resource, but with a 
one-third decrease in rainfall over the past 80 years, Darfur had long been headed 
towards a critical intersection of environmental scarcity and economic and population 
growth. 
The conflict’s beginnings are most clearly related to climatic changes that 
affected water availability in the environment and forced demographic changes. A period 
of severe drought related to warming ocean temperatures and decreased rainfall that 
began in the 1980s exacerbated the desertification of grazing land in Darfur (Abouyoub 
2012). At the same time, a growing population of humans as well as grazing animals and 
agricultural expansion put greater stress on decreasing land and water resources. As a 
result, Darfur fell victim to the demographic effects of environmental changes and 
scarcity (Polgreen 2007). Scarcities in water and useable land, whether for farming or for 
herding in the case of the Darfur Arabs, are known to cause migrations and increase 
societal stress by causing economic decline. Both farmers and herders suffer from lower 
returns due to water resources decline and desertification (Abouyoub 2012). The Arab 
pastoralists found their nomadic lifestyle unsustainable in the drought conditions, and 
many moved south and east into lands historically dominated by non-Arab farmers. 
Existing social tensions, particularly between these ethnic groups, enflamed when 
migration from drought-stricken areas to areas of greater water availability increased 
interaction between sometimes adversarial groups and competition over scarce resources 
(Polgreen 2007 and Pedraza 2016).  
Though relations between the Arab herders and non-Arab farmers have for 
centuries been characterized by intermittent periods of cooperation and competition, the 
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Darfur conflict that erupted in 2003 ushered in a marked change in relations as a result of 
the social consequences of environmental change (Abouyoub 2012). This causal 
relationship and the horrific violence of the conflict attracted strong concern from the 
international community and thrust the issue of environmental conflict into popularity 
among world leaders. Ban Ki-moon, former UN Secretary General, was critical to this 
recognition and wrote in a 2007 Washington Post article that the core of the Darfur crisis 
rested on issues of environmental degradation in concert with exploding population, 
severely decreased rainfall, and the persistence of tribal and ethnic tensions (Ki-Moon 
2007). The combination of these factors created the mix of established competitive actors 
and competitive resources that resulted in conflict. 
While surface water scarcity is more apparent in the beginnings of the conflict, 
competition over groundwater has further complicated the matter and likely contributed 
to the protracted nature of the conflict. Limited access to groundwater at well, as well as 
widely unequal distribution of surface water and inconsistent and declining rainfall make 
particular areas with known access to water much more desirable (AQUASTAT 
“Sudan”). Therefore, these areas engender greater competition and conflict between 
fighting factions. In fact, the Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South 
Sudan reported that on at least three occasions in 2014 fighters targeted and destroyed 
water access points, since they represent and easy and effective way to attack, 
manipulate, and force the displacement of civilians. This has continued despite 
international efforts to expand well access to the Lake Erie-sized aquifer under Darfur, 
amid concerns that the problem no longer lies in water scarcity, but rather in effective 
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government or regional management that encourages cooperation over conflict (Schlein 
2011 and Stephens 2011).  
According to UNICEF, the intensification of droughts in the summer months has 
shown a relationship to increased violence, demonstrating the real, ongoing impact of 
supply, demand, and structurally-induced water scarcity on this conflict (“Darfur…” 
2008). Indeed, Darfur’s water scarcity is mostly a combination of short supplies of easily 
accessible surface water and a structural failure to access groundwater resources. Lack of 
knowledge about the available groundwater resources has also contributed to the situation 
by hindering potential progress in alleviating water scarcity, and does the lack of 
government interest or ability to develop and securely manage these resources that 
currently pose a greater risk than benefit to many civilians (“Water Find…” 2007 and 
AQUASTAT “Sudan”).  
Though internationally-mediated peacemaking efforts have considered water, they 
have been mostly ineffective. The first attempt in 2006, out of which emerged the Darfur 
Peace Agreement, contained a water management section but its failure to include and 
address the concerns of many groups doomed it to be quickly abandoned. One major fault 
of the agreement was that it made only a passing reference to the resource concerns of the 
Arab pastoralists, particularly water and pasture, and left them feeling slighted (“Darfur’s 
Arab Armed Groups” 2010). By failing to address these concerns, the agreement only 
confounded the conflict even more by encouraging inter-Arab fighting over the resources 
that the agreement had failed to guarantee (“Darfur Conflict” Reuters 2014). Despite the 
2009 end to the official war, the continued violence and drought conditions prove this 
dire situation is far from solved. The perfect storm of political upheaval, inattentive 
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institutions, existing social and ethnic tensions, and environmental change-induced 
resource competition all contribute to the eruption and continuation of this conflict. 
Though the drought conditions cannot be attributed sole responsibility for the transition 
from peace to violence, it is clear that this case is far from purely ethnically motivated 
and that the environment contributed one of the essential triggers for this conversion. 
 
The Islamic State in Iraq 
Iraq and the Islamic State (IS) present a fascinating case of too little and too much 
water and the politics of controlling these resources between a government and a well-
organized non-state actor. Iraq is a water-scarce state in terms of rainfall and 
groundwater, which constitutes only about 3.65 percent of the nation’s total renewable 
water resources. Iraq relies very heavily on its rivers and lies in the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin (AQUASTAT “Iraq”). The Tigris and Euphrates and their tributaries provide the 
majority of irrigation, industrial, and municipal water for the nation and provide 
electricity through a number of hydropower dams. Though this network of surface water 
provides a significant quantity of resources, recent decades have seen a major decline in 
the amount of water that reaches Iraq due to natural and anthropogenic reasons. For one, 
NASA’s GRACE satellites found that climate-related reductions in rainfall and poor 
water management by basin nations, particularly in pollution prevention and inefficient 
irrigation and distribution, have caused the Tigris-Euphrates basin to lose water faster 
than any other area on earth besides northern India over the years 2003-2009 (Hammer 
2013). On the other hand, Turkish water projects on these rivers far before reaching Iraq 
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and Syria have reduced the natural flows of the rivers by up to 80 percent (Hammer 
2013). 
 
Figure 2: Iraq’s Dams and ISIS Control (January 2015) 
 
Source: Paraszczuk, Joanna. "ISIS Is Waging a 'Water War' in Southern Iraq." Business Insider. Business Insider, 28 
June 2015. Web. 03 Mar. 2017.  
 
In this already water vulnerable situation, control of the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers in Iraq presents a major opportunity for ISIS to control the nature of the ongoing 
conflict there. Because Iraq relies so heavily on these rivers, particularly in the marshland 
south, a significant reduction in river flow by closing upstream dams can have major 
negative economic consequences downstream. Saddam Hussein demonstrated this tactic 
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in the early 2000s by intentionally cutting off water to southern Shi’ite communities in 
order to wreck their economic and political power (Paraszczuk 2015). Now, ISIS is using 
similar modes to threaten communities within and outside of its current territorial 
holdings. Since 2013, ISIS has held a number of dams and barrages in northern Iraq that 
have allowed them to cut off water to downstream cities and provinces, weakening their 
resistance capability. While the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates were already suffering 
from overuse, pollution, and projects restricting flow in Syria and Turkey, the ISIS 
capture of the Tabqa Dam in 2013 and the Ramadi Dam in 2015 severely exacerbated the 
situation by putting the people of Iraq at the mercy of unfavorable environmental 
circumstances and the malice of ISIS (Paraszczuk 2015). While dams in upstream nations 
may be partly to blame for the issue, the control of large and small dams and barrages on 
the rivers have major geostrategic importance in this conflict, allowing ISIS to exert 
remote influence on communities far outside its secure territory. In this case, control of 
the rivers is an essential part of political and military strategy and a significant 
vulnerability for the Iraqi forces. 
Taking the page from Saddam’s playbook, ISIS has been using its upstream 
position to threaten local communities and major cities. The organization has utilized the 
selective provision and restriction of water to various communities to control residents, 
punish uncooperative areas, and generally stress the health and productivity of the nation. 
First, ISIS seizes control of a water chokepoint. Then, it uses the selective provision of 
water and electricity to force residents back to cities, where ISIS attempts to create the 
image of a functioning nation by providing utilities services (Schultz 2014). ISIS’s 
manipulation of the dams, completely irrespective of their intended release levels, has 
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also had major measureable impacts on river flow. For instance, the capture of the 
Ramadi Dam resulted in a 50 percent drop in the flow of the Euphrates (Paraszczuk 
2015). Though residents are discontented by this manipulation, in many cases they have 
little choice but to cooperate in order to supply their basic needs (Cunningham). 
Though ISIS’s cutoff of water to downstream areas is the most present concern, 
control of the dams also presents the opportunity to threaten Iraq in other ways. For 
instance, control of the Haditha Dam on the Euphrates, the nation’s largest dam, would 
also mean the ability to unleash a devastating flood and cripple the nation by cutting off 
the 30 percent of the nation’s electricity that the hydroelectric dam produces (Vidal 
2014). This particular dam has so far eluded ISIS, though the organization has used the 
threat and execution of floods and hydroelectricity cutoffs to manipulate, extort, and 
cripple smaller cities in Northern Iraq and to prevent the advancement of government 
forces (Peristianis and Abu-Hussein 2015). This may be achieved by either the closing or 
opening of the floodgates to target specific areas. The capture of the Fallujah Dam 
perfectly demonstrates the opposite effects made possible by opening or closing a dam. 
From January through April of 2014 ISIS, closed the dam to flood adjacent areas while 
cutting off flow to south and central Iraq (Collard 2014). 
This tactic is effective for pressuring the capital and punishing uncooperative 
villages, but it also serves to line ISIS’s coffers and build its image as a legitimate state. 
With control over access to water, hydroelectric production, and electricity to power well 
pumps, ISIS has extorted residents for large sums of money to supply these basic needs 
(Cunningham 2014). Even in Kurdish-recaptured areas of Iraq in which ISIS still 
maintains control of the water and electricity availability, residents are forced to either go 
 75 
without these resources or to pay the “bill” to ISIS (Cunningham 2014). This facsimile of 
an infrastructure and public works operation may not increase the organization’s 
popularity, but it does force the dependence and reluctant cooperation of residents.  
This case demonstrates water’s geostrategic potential as a tool for both crippling 
civilians and pressuring the very core of a nation. Hydrology and geography play a major 
role in the way water appears as a strategic tool in this and similar cases, as the rivers and 
dams provide clear chokepoints to target. Whether by parching or flooding, ISIS’s control 
of the dams upstream has clearly exacerbated the civilian suffering in this conflict and 
complicated the fight for the Iraqi military. 
  
  
 76 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In light of the information gleaned from these case studies, it is essential to consider 
how particular themes emerge when water engenders competition. Throughout these 
cases, as well as in the existing literature and in the findings of the quantitative analysis 
of this paper, it is clear that water scarcity in various terms is not a unique cause of 
conflict but rather a factor that exacerbates existing issues. Looking qualitatively at these 
cases, this section aims to examine the common ways in which water contributes to 
conflict via the social processes it initiates, its geographic effects on conflict, and its use 
as a political and physical tool in altering the course of conflict. With these themes in 
mind, this chapter also presents a number of concerns, opportunities, and challenges for 
the US government in dealing with situations containing these characteristics in order to 
contribute to the reduction of water’s role in current and potential intrastate disruptions. 
Though these cases all fall in the Middle East and African regions, these lessons are 
certainly not geographically limited and are intended to inform any similar situations, 
such as current water shortage issues in Mexico City and Northern India. The following 
questions provide a framework through which to view various elements of the 
relationship between water and conflict. 
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What processes result from water shortages that consistently contribute to increased 
conflict vulnerability, such as migration or economic damage?  
The most obvious of these processes is displacement and migration, which played 
a major role in the Darfur conflict. Because Darfur had little infrastructure for utilizing 
the major aquifer beneath the area, most water for agriculture and animal watering came 
from rivers fed by rains. The persistent drought that occurred in the years preceding the 
conflict, in combination with overgrazing-caused desertification exacerbated by drought, 
forced Arab herding communities to seek adequate resources outside of their historical 
territory and come into increasing competition with sedentary non-Arab farmers. Though 
the impact of this migration was aggravated by existing ethnic tensions, it is unlikely that 
conflict would have erupted without the combination of competition and existing 
tensions. This created grievances that elements of each side could leverage as reasons for 
violence. The demographic changes caused by this environmental scarcity contributed to 
the tensions and opportunities that led to the conflict. 
 Similarly, lack of reliable water infrastructure, poor management, and restrictions 
on wells have left many Palestinians without regular access to water. This condition 
hinders economic development, particularly agriculture, and a combination of lack of 
economic opportunity and water poverty has also increased Palestinian movement into 
urban areas where the potential for negative interactions with Israeli settlers increases 
considerably. Therefore, the economic impact of water scarcity results in a similar 
demographic effect with the addition of the conflict-generating potential of poverty 
stricken areas. In both cases, the lack of traditional economic opportunities decreases 
opportunity costs to fighting and encourages people to seek lucrative non-traditional or 
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illegal means of income. These effects increase the opportunity for potential return from 
illegal activities, contributing to insecurity.  
 Lastly, in the case of ISIS in Iraq water can create lucrative economic 
opportunities for those who control it by extorting civilians for access to this critical 
resource. In the greed versus grievance argument for why civil conflict emerge, this case 
falls into the greed or opportunity category. Because water access and hydroelectricity in 
Iraq are highly dependent on the control of dams, the non-state actor ISIS has gained an 
opportunity to control the population both economically and physically. Having cut off 
water and electricity at a number of dams, ISIS can extort communities for payment to 
turn back on these critical services and further fund its growth. Though this is relatively 
unique to ISIS among these three cases, it is similar to a common phenomenon in the 
West Bank and Jordan of selling trucked water for much higher prices than municipal 
water would be if it was accessible through a piped infrastructure system (Corrodin 
2016). When water scarcity widens the gap between supply and demand increases 
desperation for resources, economic opportunities such as this provide ways for both non-
state actors to fill a need while funding their (potentially terroristic or illicit) activities. 
 
How do different hydrological and geographical distributions of water contribute to 
the role of water in political or physical conflict scenarios?  
In Iraq, reliance on the rivers puts communities downstream at major risk of 
exploitation and coercion. Because the nation relies so heavily on the linear flow of water 
from headwaters to downstream communities and has already altered the natural state of 
flow through the creation of dams, it was relatively easy for ISIS to gain control of 
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chokepoints on the rivers and manipulate the release and withholding of water. 
Furthermore, this river-reliant situation allowed ISIS to make twofold threats: to either 
flood or dry out certain areas. This is a strategic vulnerability that is enabled by the 
presence of dams and barrages, as ISIS would not have close to this coercive or 
destructive power without its capture of the existing dams. Therefore, this case 
demonstrates the unique security risks associated with heavy reliance on singular water 
sources, particularly when the infrastructure that controls that water resource – not to 
mention produces hydroelectricity – is at risk for capture and exploitation as a tool of 
war.  
Israel and Palestine suffer from a similar lack of resource diversity, though the 
problem is literally hidden underground. For one, the underground nature of the aquifer 
makes deception and misinformation more feasible, as measuring extraction rates and 
water table levels is complicated and invisible. The transboundary, non-linear nature of 
aquifers also makes it nearly impossible to accurately delineate the allotments of sharing 
parties or to assign blame for pollution and overuse. In this case, already mired in 
deception and blame, this hydrological situation facilitates the usage of ambiguities for 
political and rhetorical manipulation of the water issue and the larger Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations. Furthermore, reliance on groundwater necessitates the development of 
working wells. Like the rivers in Iraq, wells create access points that can be more easily 
captured and exploited than diffuse sources. By preventing the Palestinians from drilling 
wells in many areas, Israel is able to stifle economic development and force migration. In 
addition, since the Palestinians are unable to meet their needs with the resources legally 
available to them they are essentially forced to illegally drill wells or skimp water from 
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pipelines belonging to Israel, which furthers Israel’s rhetorical goals of painting the 
Palestinians as criminal. 
In Darfur, the situation is similar to Palestine with a heavy reliance on 
groundwater today. However, this was not always the case, and the former reliance on 
rainfall and the subsequent decline due to climate change forced a demographic shift and 
a shift in water access that is increasingly concentrated in wells. This shows a 
transformation from a more diverse, diffuse distribution of water resources to a more 
limited distribution, the economic and demographic effects of which contributed to lower 
costs of violence and increased competition. Darfur shows clearly the dangers of such as 
transformation without appropriate anticipatory adaptations in place. The disruption of 
resources lead swiftly to socioeconomic disruption, which had a major hand in initiating 
this conflict.  
 
In what ways do opponents use water realities or perceptions as political tools to 
alter the course of conflict? 
ISIS’s goal of creating a territorial state is evident in the way it manipulates 
civilians with water. Its threats to devastate regions of Iraq through flooding or parching 
bolter its presentation of physical power, making control of dams and essential part of its 
operation. However, the organization not only uses its control of dams as a physical tool, 
but as a propaganda one to build an image as a state rather than an invasion by co-opting 
existing infrastructure and using that control to establish water and electricity services. 
By selectively providing water and power, ISIS forces residents back into their towns, 
which are preferred to refugee camps, and governs them. From that point, ISIS can extort 
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money from residents to provide water and power. Through these tools, ISIS is able to 
both gain monetary resources and project the image of a functioning state, complete with 
citizens, taxes, and utilities managed by the government. 
The political realities established by the 1995 Oslo Agreements in Israel and 
Palestine are a clear example of using institutions and legal processes to disenfranchise a 
discriminated party from its resource supply, as the allocations are highly unequal 
considering population and future needs. However, more interesting is the way in which 
outward compliance and enforcement of this agreement can obscure discrimination via 
water. Because these allocations and rules are cemented in international agreement, it is 
extremely difficult for the Palestinians to cry foul on Israel despite the obvious inequality. 
Israel can also focus attention on the failure of the Palestinian Authority to achieve water 
infrastructure development, whether or not this was a result of Israel’s own design. 
Therefore, Israel can exploit this situation to frame Palestinians as mismanaging, 
unreliable, irresponsible, and criminal on the international stage and bolster its case 
against them. 
 Palestinians certainly don’t shy away from this verbal back-and-forth, with a 
number of pro-Palestinian and Arabic language sources emphasizing the unfairness of the 
water sharing. One headline from Arabic news website “Palestine Today” reads “The 
Israeli Share of Water Equals Seven Times the Palestinian Share.” The Palestinian 
rhetoric focuses on the malicious intentions of the Israelis to deprive Palestinians of their 
rights to water and land, and blames the lack of development on Israeli restrictions and 
the JWC. This rhetorical mudslinging, both sides claiming victim status and 
righteousness, in the context of the ongoing conflict between them represents 
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opportunities for each to bend the international community, and therefore its support, to 
their side. 
In Darfur, the government may have allowed clashes over water and 
environmental issues to happen and used the opportunity to step in, framing the 
combatants as wild rebels that must be controlled (Polgreen 2007). Sudan’s ethnically 
and politically charged society was and is vulnerable to this exploitation, for it allowed 
the government to use threats to and clashes over water for its own political goals. Using 
water, which has been the focus of significant aid and works from the international 
community, as a trigger to act gave these actions legitimacy in appearance while 
simultaneously allowing the government to use an overly violent hand to control its 
people.  
 
Are there visible instances in which water helps mitigate, rather than exacerbate, 
political issues? 
In the case of Darfur, a number of attempts to use water for peace emerged 
following the international recognition of the environmental roots of the conflict. In 2007, 
scientists found a useable freshwater aquifer the size of Lake Erie under Darfur territory 
(Polgreen 2007). Since that time, NGOs and government from around the world have 
supported attempts to expand access to this aquifer in the region with the goal of 
mitigating the environmental issues underlying the fighting. Indeed, many reports on the 
aquifer’s finding questioned whether it would bring an end to the conflict, and in 2011 
the International Conference on Water for Sustainable Peace in Darfur sought 
international fundraising for the application of water projects around the nation. 
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Nevertheless, despite this wave of international optimism for water cooperation the 
execution of these projects has continued to be limited by security concerns and lack of 
access to critical areas.  
UNICEF’s engagement in water table monitoring and water management 
education, including rainwater capturing and irrigation improvement, in Darfur are 
helping to show the beginnings of this potential by attempting to mitigate the worst 
conditions in the summer, when violence also tends to spike (“Darfur” UNICEF 2008). 
Furthermore, despite indications that local communities have been able to establish water 
sharing arrangements, there is considerable concern that simply placing wells will only 
contribute to the conflict by creating another incentive to capture areas with wells 
(Schlein 2011 and Polgreen 2007). 
In order for water to contribute to widespread cooperation, it is essential that the 
most powerful body in a nation, the government, commit to establishing appropriate 
management practices that encourage resource sharing rather than resources capture 
(Schlein 2011). This is especially important in the cases of intrastate conflicts as studied 
here. Because actors are intrastate, international intervention is unlikely even when the 
lack of a strong central government authority permits violence. This is in contrast to 
interstate water conflicts, which are more heavily deterred by the threat of violence and 
international treaties. Therefore, the intrastate nature of these conflicts further facilitates 
the use of violence and reinforces the need for effective central or regional management. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
AND SECURITY 
 The US Intelligence Community has publicly recognized the potential impact of 
water degradation on US security through the disruption of political and economic 
stability in areas of interest to the US, which would degrade the security of the 
international system and adversely affect US foreign policy, economic, security, and 
development goals. From a foreign policy and intelligence standpoint, it is essential to 
create a mental framework through which to view and understand, identify, and mitigate 
the potential impacts of water issues on security. The creation of heuristics for 
understanding environmental impacts can prevent their being overlooked in analysis and 
policy. Therefore, to further that framework, the cases and the analysis of these issues 
demonstrate an array of mechanisms through which water affects conflict onsets, 
proceedings, and outcomes, and provides the following discernable trends. 
 
Water scarcities affect socioeconomic and demographic realities 
In all the cases, water scarcity has hindered economic growth, decreased 
opportunity costs of conflict by inducing poverty, and forced migration. These standard 
impacts have further predictable effects, such as increased competition between 
adversarial groups in Darfur. While it is essential to recognize standard effects such as 
these, it is also necessary to contextualize the effects in the situation of unique nations 
and societies in order to predict further impacts such as the onset of an ethnic war. When 
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left unmitigated, water scarcities whether chronic or acute are highly likely to contribute 
to socioeconomic grievances and shift demographics into potentially more insecure 
patterns. 
 
Information is key  
It is in the interest of the United States to invest in the gathering of accurate water 
data so that NGOs and policymakers can make clear, confident decisions on issues 
related to water. Though global water data is available in many varieties thanks to the 
efforts of international bodies and researchers, these instances call for greater on-the-
ground, localized water intelligence on particular issues. This is particularly important for 
overcoming misinformation and deception and creating an objective picture of a conflict 
or potential conflict. The usage of the water issue by both Israel and Palestine to gain 
international sympathy is a foreign policy move itself, and in order for the United States 
to make fair, smart decisions on the issue it must have accurate, unbiased context. 
Similarly, the potential use of the massive aquifer under Darfur to aid the establishment 
of security is very promising, but without clear information on management practices on 
the ground and their efficacy it is difficult to make informed decisions on the usefulness 
of supplying aid or pursing development projects. Because of the potential for water to 
contribute to conflict and for water resource development to mitigate it, the United States 
would benefit significantly from the small investment it would require to seek such 
information. International NGOs such as UNICEF are already engaged in attempts to 
conduct research and execute projects, and would be valuable partners in this undertaking 
(“Darfur – Overview” UNICEF). 
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Different hydrological and geographical distributions of water affect societies 
differently 
Understanding these differences is critical to predicting ways in which water may 
be utilized as a tool of conflict or contribute to instability. Groundwater tends to evade 
clear measurement and division, which contributes to ambiguity. It also requires wells to 
access, which can be difficult to acquire and therefore contribute to a lack of community 
self-sufficiency and contribute to poverty. Both a high dependence on wells and rivers in 
water-scare areas can be dangerous by creating chokepoints for adversaries to target and 
easily cut off access to large number of people or extort them to pay for access. Rivers 
and the dams on them carry significant vulnerabilities as well, as they provide the 
controller the ability to affect areas far below stream by either cutting off flow or 
flooding downstream areas. 
In general, it appears that diversified water resources are the most stable and least 
vulnerable. Even a high dependence on rainwater, as Darfur had before the droughts, 
increases the vulnerability of a society. Societies dependent on any one of these resources 
are at a high risk of negative impacts if the availability of this resources changes, 
particularly when a sense of confidence and assurance in it has made water management 
and economic systems in the area inflexible and inadaptable to changes. These societies 
are most at risk of shocks from either climatic changes or human manipulation of the 
resources. Therefore, the United States would benefit national and regional stability by 
identifying vulnerable nations and aiding their diversification. 
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Preparation, prevention, and adaptation are necessary to avoid environmental 
shocks 
Finally, among the most critical pieces of this issue is acknowledgement of the 
effects of changing climatic conditions and their ability to impact sociopolitical and 
economic realities. Though anthropogenic climate change remains debated as a cause of 
these changes, it is essential to recognize and prepare to adapt for the symptoms of a 
changing climate by any cause. Water resources are intimately tied to overall climate 
patterns, and therefore can be anticipated to change subtly and dramatically around the 
world in coming generations. By understanding the socioeconomic mechanisms 
associated with water scarcities, the necessity of current and accurate water resource data, 
and the importance of diversified water resources, the United States can lead the world in 
creating adaptive plans for unpredictable future environments. 
 The conflict in Darfur is a shining example of how entrenched socioeconomic 
systems were shocked by environmental changes and unable to cope effectively with the 
resultant changes. In the face of a changing climate and growing global population, it is 
highly likely that areas around the world will be increasingly threatened by water scarcity 
issues. It is therefore first essential to acknowledge these climatic developments and 
research their potential effects, and secondly to build effective coping strategies. 
Therefore, in order to encourage stability, the United States can identify similarly 
threatened societies and focus on providing aid to diversify resources, educate 
populations and governments, and support the capacity building of states so that they are 
more effectively able to make necessary adaptations. It is absolutely critical to consider 
the interaction of scarcity of resources and a lack of stability and governance, as one 
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encourages competition and one allows leeway for competitors to use extrajudicial means 
to acquire what they want.  
In conclusion, it is in the strong national interest of the United States to build 
frameworks for understanding, identifying, and preparing for the destabilizing effect of 
changing water resources. By identifying the mechanism and relationships that link water 
and conflict, the United States can aid global and national security by investing attention 
in acquiring essential information, efforts to build capacity for effectively dealing with 
shocks, and mitigating the effect of water scarcity before they worsen.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis, to examine relationships between water availability or 
scarcity and conflict with social divides as an intervening variable, was executed 
successfully despite the lack of significant evidence to support the hypotheses. This 
design method very thoroughly examined multiple measures of water and representations 
of ethnic socio-political divides as they affect, both separately and through interaction 
terms, the likelihood of a violent or non-violent conflict onset. Though the lack of 
significance in the results is disappointing, it is also telling, and can easily be understood 
according to the existing framework around this relationship and through the case studies 
which show the various ways that water affects security without a direct causal link. 
Most preceding studies acknowledged water scarcity, like other forms of 
environmental scarcity, as a contributor and perhaps a catalyzing factor in conflict but not 
as a direct cause. This study attempted to augment that understanding by more 
specifically looking at how those processes that are acknowledged to occur and 
contribute to conflict as a result of environmental change – for example, migration, 
economic downturn, and increased competition over resources – might be exacerbated by 
the presence of social divides. That is to say, to examine whether their existence might be 
a catalyzing factor that transforms a benign water-scarce situation into conflict by 
increasing motives for both greed- and grievance- driven conflict. While the quantitative 
section failed to capture this in significant results, the qualitative section was better able 
to discuss these less direct trends. 
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 Though this study did not attempt to quantitatively measure these mediating 
processes and instead focused on the eventual outcome of violent or non-violent conflict 
campaign onset, it endeavored to capture them in the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. By testing various water measures to represent both 
supply-, demand-, and structurally-induced scarcity against measures for regime type, 
ethnic fractionalization, and inclusion and exclusion of population sectors from 
participation in governance, the tests found few significant results. These may be 
explained by missing data, but in generally the models failed to support the hypotheses 
and therefore indicate that almost no causal relationships can be assumed from the 
presence and/or interaction of these two independent variables. Though some significant 
results appeared for violent conflict outcomes, only one model showed a result for 
nonviolent outcomes at any notable level of significance.  
 Perhaps the most surprising outcome of this analysis is the finding in multiple 
models that the measure total water withdrawal per capita (m3/ inhabitant/year) was 
correlated with a slight positive increase (.001 invariably) in the likelihood of a violent 
conflict outcome with varying degrees of significance across models. This result goes 
against the relationships posited in the hypotheses that increasing water withdrawals 
would indicate better access and therefore decrease the likelihood of conflict. Though the 
invariable nature of the coefficient makes this result suspect to questions of whether 
incomplete data produced an inaccurate representation of the relationship, this result also 
leads to a different interpretation of water availability. Whereas the hypothesis and 
models assumed that increasing withdrawals would decrease competition, this measure 
could simultaneously be viewed as an indication of stress on water resources. As 
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withdrawals per capita increase, particularly in nations with lower levels of per capita 
renewable resources to begin with, resulting degradation of a nation’s resources may be 
the root of increased competition for decreasingly available resources. Though this test 
was not included in this paper, further examination of water stress rather than availability 
would be useful for contextualizing this result.  
 In support of the theory, the models testing Hypothesis 5 indicated with 
significance that an interaction of number of peace years and total population with access 
to safe drinking water (%) had an expected negative effect on the likelihood of both 
violent and non-violent campaign onsets. Though both variables are likely associated 
with nations that in general are more developed, these models controlled for population 
and GDP, making the results more apparently related to the interacting variables 
themselves rather than simply the most likely context of a nation that is developed, 
peaceful, and able to build and maintain infrastructure. Thus, this relationship may be the 
result of the larger context of a stable nation, but the model indicates that a relationship 
between increased access to safe drinking water in combination with longer periods of 
peace may act to quell the greed and grievance influences on the onset of conflict as well.  
Moving forward, it would likely be useful to re-conduct this study with more 
complete data that might better represent the reality of global water availability and 
therefore these relationships. Though this study found few significant results to support 
the theory, it is likely due to the missingness of data that these models may not be 
perfectly representative of the reality of this relationship. Though the NAVCO and EPR 
datasets are very comprehensive, the Aquastat data suffers from massive holes across 
variables and countries so that it actually represents a very limited amount of information. 
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Aquastat certainly provides useful data, but the set also epitomizes the difficulties faced 
by researchers attempting to examine similar questions and theories. Lack of information 
on water measures for the world in coded, accessible formats was a hindrance to the 
reliability of this analysis and demonstrates one of the reasons for lack of consensus on 
water’s role in conflict in the political science discipline. Though indeed the results of 
this study may well represent the reality that there are no direct relationships to be found, 
it would be impractical to rely on such incomplete data to dismiss the possibility of a 
such outright. 
 Though Hypothesis 5 received support from the models, and the measure for per 
capita water withdrawals produced an unexpended positive result, it can be assumed that 
no other quantitatively recognizable relationships exist between water availability, in the 
method it was represented here, and conflict. Nor can it be said that the presence of ethnic 
socio-political divides informs or intervenes in this association in a way that it affects the 
outcome. Overall, therefore, the theory loses credence from the lack of quantitative 
evidence.  
However, this result is telling in that it indicates the highly-individualized nature 
of water issues in conflict and emphasizes the importance of lessons gained from the case 
studies. Because a number of cases exist that have clear connections between water 
scarcity and conflict, such as Israel and Palestine, Darfur, and ISIS in Iraq, it cannot be 
said that water scarcity or management has no impact. Rather, the lack of quantitative 
evidence from this whole-world analysis suggests that when water does impact a conflict, 
it does so in individualized and ungeneralizable ways. In all, this last lesson may be the 
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most significant of all in understanding the elusive effects of this environmental issue on 
conflict outcomes. 
These cases demonstrate relationships between water availability and security that 
elude the models tested in this thesis and further support the idea that water’s relationship 
with conflict is present but convoluted and weak compared to other factors. In each, a 
scarcity of water makes the population more vulnerable and reveals the dangers of 
dependence on non-diverse water resources while providing opponents in a conflict an 
issue very important to civilians that can be rhetorically manipulated to garner support. 
They support the idea that migration and economic impacts are major effects of water 
scarcity that can drive tensions, particularly in ethnically divided societies, and further 
contribute to destabilization. They provide examples of how water access may be used as 
an exploitative tool to control populations by both the state and by non-state actors, or as 
a tool with which to threaten physical violence. However, they also reveal the potential 
for appropriate management of water to decrease competition between groups and aid in 
the institution of peace. 
Both the quantitative and qualitative sections of this thesis contribute useable 
knowledge of water-related security trends applicable to United States national security 
interests. While the models showed little support for the hypotheses, this lack of 
significant results indicate the highly diverse effects of water on the potential for conflict 
and reiterates the importance of development, in terms of GDP in the models, on 
decreasing the likelihood of conflict. Therefore, the case studies move down from the 
global to the local level to identify generalizable trends in the water-conflict relationship 
not captured by the models. Identification of these trends indicates that the United States 
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can contribute to preventing water-related destabilization by aiding the development of 
nations and, in particular, their capacity to effectively handle water scarcities and their 
social and economic effects. From these cases, it appears that the United States can help 
nations evade these negative effects and better prepare for the uncertain climate 
conditions of the future by focusing on research and frameworks for identifying at-risk 
areas and applying knowledge of the potential impacts to prevent destabilization through 
capacity building and resource diversification. As a world leader in security and aid, it is 
certainly in the purview of the United States to engage in such a task. It would 
furthermore be an oversight to ignore water stress issues, as their contributions to 
destabilization may easily become transnational and regional. The United States’ interest 
in protecting the homeland from the global social, migration, and economic effects of 
regional instability is therefore at stake in the decision to take up this charge.  
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